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HIS Article reviews legislative and case law developments in the ar-
eas of wills, nontestamentary transfers, heirship, estate administra-
tion, guardianships, and trusts. The Survey period covers decisions
published between November 1, 1992, and September 30, 1993, as well as
changes to the Probate Code, the Property Code, and other codes and stat-
utes enacted by the Seventy-Third Texas Legislature that affect the areas of
estate planning and probate.
I. WILLS
A. WILL CONTESTS
In Green v. Earnest I the court affirmed a summary judgment in which the
trial court found that the decedent did not sign his will as the result of undue
influence.2 The decedent's common law wife offered the decedent's last will,
which he executed shortly before his death, for probate and the court admit-
ted the will to probate in December 1989. The will appointed the decedent's
wife as independent executrix of the estate and trustee of the testamentary
trust for the benefit of the decedent's sons. The will left one-third of the
decedent's estate to his wife and the other two-thirds equally to his sons, in
trust. This testamentary scheme was essentially the same as the decedent's
first will, which he executed in 1986, but differed from a will that the dece-
dent signed in 1988, in which the decedent named a friend as an equal one-
fourth beneficiary with the wife and sons and as co-trustee of the sons' trust.
Following the date the court admitted the will to probate, another court
found that his wife caused the decedent's death by shooting him. The friend
then filed a will contest, in which he sought to have the 1989 will set aside on
the basis that the wife exercised undue influence over her husband to cause
him to change his will. The contestant admitted in a deposition that the
only evidence that he had of undue influence was based on his opinions and
beliefs. His first amended petition alleged that the jury verdict that the wife
caused the decedent's death provided evidence that she exerted undue influ-
ence over her husband. The trial court found no undue influence and
granted the wife's motion for summary judgment. The appeals court found
that the contestant's opinions and beliefs about whether the wife exerted un-
* B.A., University of Texas at Arlington; M.L.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University.
Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 840 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
2. Id. at 123.
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due influence did not provide sufficient evidence of undue influence.3 The
court found that no evidence existed that the wife unduly influenced the
decedent.4
In Oechsner v. Ameritrust Texas, N.A. 5 the court found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit the appellant's re-
quested definition of insane delusion to the jury since the appellant's re-
quested definition varied from the definition established by Texas case law.6
The decedent and his wife executed wills that had mirror provisions, in
which each left his or her property in trust for the survivor, then equally to
their children. The decedent's wife later changed her will without telling the
decedent. The decedent discovered that his wife had changed her will, leav-
ing her entire estate to the children, following her death. The decedent then
changed his will and left his entire estate to a charity. The decedent later
executed a codicil in which he left his residence to his housekeeper. The
decedent was ninety-three when he executed his new will and codicil. Fol-
lowing his death, his children contested the will and codicil, alleging that the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity because he was under an insane delu-
sion and subject to undue influence by the charity and the housekeeper. The
jury found that the charity and housekeeper did not exert undue influence
and that the decedent was not under an insane delusion at the time he exe-
cuted the will and codicil. The decedent's son requested the trial court to
submit his definition of insane delusion to the jury, which the court refused
to do. The trial court did not sign the proposed instruction, nor did it note
that it had refused the instruction, but the appeals court found that the son
objected to the trial court's proposed instruction and thus preserved the er-
ror for appeal. 7 The son wished to add language to the court's instruction
that would expand the definition of insane delusion beyond that found in
Texas case law.8 The court of appeals found that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to expand the definition of insane delusion by
submitting the son's proposed instruction. 9 The appeals court also found
that it could not consider the son's argument on appeal that the trial court
3. Id.
4. Id. The court stated that the fact that the 1989 will returned to the same dispository
scheme as the first will indicated that the wife did not exert undue influence. Id. Further, the
court found that the fact that the wife shot the decedent shortly after he made the 1989 will
does not provide rational or logical evidence that she exerted undue influence in connection
with the will. Id.
5. 840 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1992, writ denied).
6. Id. at 135.
7. Id. at 133. The court noted that the son specifically objected to the proposed instruc-
tion in a timely manner, that opposing counsel was aware of the objection, and that the court
clearly overruled the son's objection. Id.
8. The courts have defined a two-pronged test for insane delusion: the testator believes
supposed facts that do not exist and that no rational person would believe. See Lindley v.
Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. 1964); Knight v. Edwards, 153 Tex. 170, 264 S.W.2d 692,
695 (1954); Vance v. Upson, 66 Tex. 476, 1 S.W. 179, 179-80 (1886); Bauer v. Estate of Bauer,
687 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The son
wished to expand the definition to provide that an insane delusion is due to "some organic
defect in the brain or some functional disorder of the mind." 840 S.W.2d at 134.
9. 840 S.W.2d at 135.
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did not link the ideas of insane delusion and testamentary capacity in its
charge since the son failed to object to the charge on this ground.10
In Hoffman v. Texas Commerce Bank N.A. 1' the court held that the trial
court did not commit error in denying the contestants' motions to set aside
deemed admissions 12 and in granting summary judgment based on the
deemed admissions. 13 The contestants based their contest of the decedent's
will and holographic codicil on the grounds that the decedent lacked testa-
mentary capacity and that the decedent executed the will and codicil as the
result of undue influence. The will proponent mailed interrogatories and
requests for admissions to the contestants, which gave the contestants thirty
days to respond. Some two months later contestants filed a motion to extend
the time to file their responses to the interrogatories and admissions and to
set aside the deemed admissions. The contestants' counsel claimed in the
motion that the proponent's counsel had orally agreed to extend the time for
response. The proponent then filed a motion for summary judgment and
filed a response to the contestants' motion, in which the proponent's counsel
denied the existence of an oral agreement. The trial court granted the pro-
ponent's motion for summary judgment. The contestants appealed, alleging
that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant them additional
time to respond to the interrogatories and requests for admissions and that
the trial court erred in granting a summary judgment based on the deemed
admissions. The appeals court found that the contestants did not show good
cause for their failure to answer within the specified time frame by merely
alleging an oral agreement with opposing counsel. 14 The court also found
that the deemed admissions did not inquire into the decedent's state of mind
by stating opinions concerning the testator's capacity or undue influence,
and even if the deemed admissions did inquire into state of mind, these in-
quiries are not improper. 5 Thus, the trial court could consider the deemed
admissions concerning testamentary capacity and undue influence.' 6
B. WILL CONSTRUCTION
In Johnson v. McLaughlin 17 the court considered the language of the will
concerning payment of debts, taxes, and expenses, and determined that the
testator intended that income earned from the residuary estate during the
period of administration be available for payment of debts, taxes, and ex-
10. Id. The court also found that the jury's answers to questions concerning the dece-
dent's testamentary capacity at the time that he executed the will and codicil were not against
the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 137. The court finally found that the son waived his
right to have six jurors, rather than the twelve jurors that the court empaneled, decide the case
since the son did not provide the court with a record showing his objection to a trial by twelve
jurors or any ruling of the trial court on an objection. Id. at 138.
11. 846 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
12. Id. at 340.
13. Id. at 341.
14. Id. at 340.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 341.
17. 840 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
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penses.' 8 The testator set aside certain liquid assets for the payment of
debts, taxes, and expenses prior to her death. The testator's will directed her
executor to pay debts, taxes, and expenses as soon as practicable following
her death. The testator provided that if the liquid assets were insufficient to
meet her obligations, her executor could sell certain parcels of real estate to
raise the funds necessary to meet the obligations; she also authorized the
executor to borrow money and mortgage other real property to meet the
obligations. The testator divided her residuary estate into two trusts, with
identical terms and the same beneficiaries. The independent executor named
in the will declined to serve and the court appointed a temporary administra-
tor with limited powers. The administration of the estate took approxi-
mately six years. The administrator found that the assets that the testator
set aside for payment of her obligations were insufficient to cover all of the
debts, taxes, and expenses of the estate. The administrator used income
earned from estate assets, including assets in the residuary estate, to pay the
obligations. The probate court approved the final account and ordered the
administrator to distribute the estate according to the terms of the will. One
of the beneficiaries of the residuary trusts appealed, asserting that the will
did not allow the administrator to use income derived from the residuary
estate to pay the estate's obligations. The appeals court first determined that
the interest of the beneficiaries of the residuary estate vested at the time of
the testator's death.' 9 The court next determined that the testator did not
explicitly state in her will whether the personal representative could use in-
come to meet estate obligations. 20 The court reviewed the will as a whole
and inferred that the testator intended for the personal representative to use
income to meet the obligations. 2'
In Turner v. AdaMs 2 2 the court construed the terms of the testator's will
to determine whether a class gift of a remainder interest created a vested or
contingent interest 23 and the time for determination of members of the
class. 24 The testator gave her husband a life estate in her property, with a
18. Id. at 675.
19. Id. at 671, 673. The court noted that the testator used the words, "I have created two
trust estates .... " in referring to the residuary trusts, which implied that she considered the
creation of the trusts complete at the time her will became operative. Id. at 672. Further, the
court found TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1994) to provide that property vests
in the beneficiaries immediately upon the testator's death unless the testator specifically pro-
vides otherwise in the will. Id. at 671-72. The court could find no indication that the testator
intended to postpone vesting of title in the beneficiaries. Id. at 672. The court also found that
a contrary construction of the will would result in violation of the rule against perpetuities,
causing the residuary gifts to lapse and pass by intestacy, thus defeating the testator's purposes.
Id. at 672-73. The court concluded that the testator intended for title to the residuary estate to
vest in the residuary beneficiaries at her death. Id. at 673.
20. Id. at 674.
21. Id. at 674-75. Although the court found conflicting language in the will, the court
determined that language in the will recognizing that the personal representative might use
income to meet estate obligations outweighed language inferring that the personal representa-
tive should preserve income for the residuary beneficiaries. Id. at 675.
22. 855 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, no writ).
23. Id. at 737-39.
24. Id. at 739-40.
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remainder to her nieces and nephews. The testator's husband and several
nieces and nephews survived her, but one nephew predeceased the testator's
husband. Some years following the testator's death, and prior to the
nephew's death, the testator's husband and three of the remainder benefi-
ciaries created a trust for the husband's benefit from the assets of the life
estate. Following the nephew's death, the trustees distributed some assets of
the trust to the surviving remainder beneficiaries, but made no distribution
to the nephew's estate. The nephew's executor asked the court for a declara-
tory judgment construing the provisions of the testator's will providing the
gift of the remainder interest to her nieces and nephews. The trial court
found that the deceased nephew's share of the estate lapsed since he did not
survive the testator's husband. The nephew's executor appealed, arguing
that the trial court incorrectly found that the remainder interest was contin-
gent and that the will created a valid trust. The appeals court first consid-
ered whether the remainder gift to the testator's nieces and nephews was a
contingent or vested gift.25 The court concluded that the will contained no
provision that required a niece or nephew to survive the testator's husband
in order for the gift to vest. 26 Further, the court noted that class gifts ordi-
narily vest at the time of the testator's death unless the testator provides
otherwise in the will. 27 The court found that the remainder gift to the testa-
tor's nieces and nephews vested at the time of the testator's death. 28 The
court then examined when the determination of the class of remainder bene-
ficiaries should occur. 29 The court found that the testator's will contained a
provision for a gift over to the children of a niece or nephew who did not
survive her husband, and that the testator must have meant for this survivor-
ship clause to prevent the interest of the deceased nephew from passing to
his estate.30 The court also considered the validity of the trust that the testa-
tor's husband and several of the remainder beneficiaries created and particu-
larly considered the distributions of trust assets to nieces and nephews prior
to the husband's death. 3 1 The court concluded that any distributions made
to nieces or nephews prior to the husband's death were invalid. 32
C. WILL EXECUTION
In Triestman v. Kilgore 33 the court, in a per curiam decision in which it
denied writ, disapproved of the court of appeals' reasoning about the compe-
25. Id. at 737-39.
26. Id. at 738.
27. Id. at 739 (citing Houston v. Schumann, 92 S.W.2d 1086, 1089 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1936, writ refd)).
28. Id. at 739.
29. Id. at 739-40.
30. Id. at 740. The court concluded that the deceased nephew's interest lapsed to the
other class members at his death and affirmed the result of the trial court's construction of the
will. Id.
31. Id. at 740-41.
32. Id. The court based its reasoning on its analysis of the nature of the remainder inter-
est given to the nieces and nephews. Id.
33. 838 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1992).
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tence of witnesses.34 The court first stated that the terms "credible witness"
and "competent witness" are synonymous. 35 The court then stated that a
witness who does not receive a benefit under the will is a competent wit-
ness. 36 The court found that neither witness to the will in question received
a benefit under the will and that the will itself provided some evidence that
the witnesses were credible. 37 The court of appeals improperly did not con-
sider the will as evidence of the witnesses' competence or credibility. 38
D. MUTUAL WILLS
In Kilpatrick v. Harris3 9 the court considered whether the decedent and
her husband executed contractual wills4° and whether the trial court cor-
rectly imposed a constructive trust on the decedent's estate.4' The decedent
and her husband executed wills in 1974 in which each gave the other a life
estate in his or her property, with the remainder passing to his or her family.
The decedent and her husband began making gifts to family members sev-
eral years prior to the husband's death, with equal gifts made to each side of
the family. The decedent was unable to locate her husband's will following
his death, and she took all of his property through intestacy. The decedent
then executed a new will in which she left half of her estate to her husband's
sisters and the other half of her estate to her family, apparently in the belief
that her will would provide the dispositive scheme that she and her husband
had planned. Following the decedent's death, her executor found the hus-
band's 1974 will and offered it for probate. The executor claimed that the
decedent and her husband had contractual wills, while the husband's sisters
requested that the court set aside the affidavit of heirship and distribute the
husband's estate according to his will. The jury found that the decedent and
her husband executed contractual wills and that decedent's last will violated
the terms of the agreement that she had with her husband about their dispos-
itive scheme. The trial court imposed a constructive trust on the decedent's
estate. The appeals court first determined that evidence supported the jury's
finding that the couple executed contractual wills. 42 The court also found
34. Id. at 547-48.
35. Id. at 547.
36. Id.
37. Id. The court of appeals held that the will proponent offered no evidence that the
witnesses were credible at the time of the execution of the will. In re Estate of Hutchins, 829
S.W.2d 295, 299-300 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). For a discussion of this
case, see Lynne M. Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV.
1831, 1831-32 (1993).
38. 829 S.W.2d at 299-300.
39. 848 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
40. Id. at 862-65.
41. Id. at 865-66.
42. Id. at 863. The evidence that the jury considered included testimony offered by the
couple's accountant and friends that the couple always intended to divide their assets equally
between their two families on the death of the survivor, the 1974 wills themselves, which did
not contain language specifically stating that they were contractual wills, and the history of
equal gifts that the couple made to their families over the years and that the decedent contin-
ued after her husband's death. The appeals court determined that the terms of the agreement
between the couple were not too indefinite or vague for enforcement. Id. The appeals court
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that the decedent made her later will in an attempt to dispose of the estate in
the manner that she and her husband intended, based on her belief that her
husband died intestate, and that to probate the husband's 1974 will and the
decedent's later will would constitute a fraud on both estates.43 The court
found that the trial court's order concerning the distribution of the hus-
band's estate did not violate the terms of his will. 44
E. PRIVITY
In Thomas v. Pryor45 the court considered whether a beneficiary named
under a will may sue the attorney who prepared the will for malpractice.46
The attorney prepared the will through a pro bono project. The testator
named a friend as the beneficiary of the residuary estate. No witnesses ever
signed the will and the probate court refused to admit the will to probate.
The friend sued the attorney for malpractice, alleging that the attorney's
negligence by having no witnesses sign the will led to the loss of her benefits
under the will. The attorney moved for summary judgment, alleging that he
owed no duty to the beneficiary since he had no attorney-client relationship
with her. The trial court granted the summary judgment and the beneficiary
appealed. The appeals court first examined the current state of the law in
Texas.47 The court found that no privity existed between the proposed bene-
ficiary and the attorney and declined to initiate a change in Texas law on the
issue. 48 The court also found that public policy supports the privity rule
because of the importance of confidential communications between the testa-
tor and his attorney. 49
also upheld the jury's finding that the effect of the decedent's last will would be to distribute
three-fourths of the estate to her husband's sisters and one-fourth of the estate to her family,
which was clearly not the dispositive scheme that she and her husband envisioned. Id. at 864.
The court found that the couple's agreement did not breach the statute of frauds because of
partial performance, id., and that the law did not require that contractual wills expressly state
the existence of the contract at the time the couple executed their wills in 1974. Id.; see TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon 1980), which only applies to contractual wills executed
after September 1, 1979.
43. 848 S.W.2d at 865. The court again referred to the couple's intention that each family
would receive half of their joint estate. Id.
44. Id. at 866. The trial court ordered distribution of one-fourth of the combined estate to
each of the husband's sisters, with distribution of the other one-half of the combined estates to
the decedent's family in the proportions that the decedent and her husband each set out in
their 1974 wills.
45. 847 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism'd by agr.).
46. Id. at 303-05.
47. Id. at 304-05. The court noted that only a client may hold his attorney liable for
malpractice. Id. at 304 (citing Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151, 156 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1989, writ denied); Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)). The court specifically noted that Texas courts have held that an attorney owes no
duty to intended beneficiaries of wills or trusts improperly executed or prepared. 847 S.W.2d
at 305 (citing Dickey v. Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, 717 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. App--San
Antonio 1986, writ dism'd by agr.)).





In Shaw v. Shaw 50 the court determined that joint accounts, designated as
"joint with survivorship accounts" on the signature cards, were not survivor-
ship accounts.5" The decedent changed two of his separate property ac-
counts to joint accounts with his second wife after their marriage. Following
the decedent's death his widow changed the accounts to her name, based
upon her assertion of survivorship rights. The decedent's daughter, who was
independent executrix of her father's estate, challenged her stepmother's ac-
tions on the basis that the signature cards did not qualify as survivorship
agreements. The trial court held that the signature cards created a survivor-
ship right as a matter of law and granted the widow's motion for partial
summary judgment. On appeal the court noted that Probate Code section
439(a) 52 provides that in order for a right of survivorship to exist the party
who dies must have signed a written agreement that specifies that the dece-
dent's interest in the account passes to the surviving party or parties to the
account. 53 The court found that the words "joint with survivorship" do not
substantially follow the statutory language necessary to create a survivorship
right. 54 The court reversed the trial court and rendered judgment that the
accounts belonged to the estate and not to the decedent's widow.5 5
The court in Ephran v. Frazier56 also found that no survivorship rights
existed in two joint accounts. 57 The decedent and the joint account holder
did not mark the box available on either signature card to indicate that the
accounts were joint accounts with survivorship rights. The depository
agreement for each account contained a definition of joint accounts with
rights of survivorship and a statement that the parties agreed that the funds
on hand at the death of one joint tenant would become the property of the
survivor, but the depository agreements do not indicate that the parties in-
tended for the accounts to have survivorship rights. Following the dece-
dent's death the joint tenant claimed the funds in both accounts as his funds.
50. 835 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, writ denied). This area of the law continues
to create controversy and confusion, and has been the source of much litigation in the past few
years. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990) (holding that the signature
card did not create survivorship rights); Kitchen v. Sawyer, 814 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, writ denied) (holding that the signature card did not create survivorship rights);
Martinez v. Martinez, 805 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ) (holding that
the signature card did not create survivorship rights). In an effort to bring some order to this
chaos the legislature created a new uniform account form, which contains all of the types of
accounts available with brief explanations of each type of account and language clearly suffi-
cient to create rights of survivorship if the parties to the account so intend. Act of May 24,
1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 795, § 2, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3157, 3157-59 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A (Vernon Supp. 1994)). See infra note 284 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of the new account card.
51. 835 S.W.2d at 235.
52. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
53. 835 S.W.2d at 234.
54. Id. at 235 (citing the statutory language found in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1994)).
55. 835 S.W.2d at 236.
56. 840 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
57. Id. at 87.
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The executor claimed the funds as estate funds, alleging that the style of the
accounts did not create joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, that the
signature cards and depository agreements do not designate the accounts as
joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, and that the signature cards do
not contain sufficient language to remove the funds from the probate estate.
The trial court agreed with the executor and the joint tenant appealed. On
appeal the court held that, although the accounts were joint accounts, the
signature cards and depository agreements did not create joint tenancies
with rights of survivorship. 58
In MBank Corpus Christi v. Shiner 59 the court considered the issue of the
bank's liability in paying the funds on deposit to the joint account holder.60
The decedent and his sister were joint signatories on a checking account that
the decedent opened in 1980. The designation on the account was joint ten-
ancy with right of survivorship, and this account was not at issue in the case.
The decedent later opened a certificate of deposit in his name and his sister's
name, but he did not designate the certificate of deposit as a joint tenancy
with right of survivorship. Following the decedent's death his sister re-
quested the bank to deliver the funds in the certificate of deposit to her,
which the bank did. The decedent's two grandchildren later presented an
affidavit of heirship to the bank, followed by an order based on a small estate
affidavit naming the two grandchildren as the decedent's distributees. The
two grandchildren sued the bank after learning that the bank paid the certifi-
cate of deposit to the joint tenant, contending that the certificate of deposit
was not a joint tenancy with right of survivorship account. The grandchil-
dren filed a motion for summary judgment and the bank countered with its
own motion, asserting that it paid the funds to a joint account holder and
that the Probate Code protected it from liability for doing so. The trial court
found that the bank breached the certificate of deposit agreement by deliver-
ing the funds to the joint account holder and granted summary judgment in
favor of the grandchildren. The appeals court found that the certificate of
deposit was not a survivorship account and that the decedent's interest in the
account passed to his heirs on his death. 6 1 The court further found that the
bank could distribute the funds to either party to the account despite the
death of the other party and that the heirs to an account holder have no
right to distribution of the funds unless they present proof of the account
holder's death and the account has no right of survivorship provision.62 The
court determined that the bank could have properly acted by paying the
funds either to the decedent's heirs or to the surviving joint account
holder.63 Because the decedent's grandchildren did not give the bank
written instructions not to distribute the funds to the surviving account
holder, the court determined that the bank had no liability for distribution of
58. Id.
59. 840 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
60. Id. at 725-27.
61. Id. at 726.





In Ivey v. Steele65 the court affirmed the trial court's findings that some
accounts were joint tenancies with rights of survivorship and others were
joint accounts with no survivorship rights.66 The decedent opened a coten-
ancy account with one woman and several joint accounts with a second wo-
man. Following the decedent's death the two joint account holders qualified
as co-executors of the decedent's will. The two co-executors filed a petition
for declaratory judgment in which they asked the court to determine the
ownership of the accounts. The co-executor who held joint accounts with
the decedent filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the ac-
counts passed to her as joint tenant with right of survivorship. The other co-
executor filed a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the estate, claim-
ing that the accounts were probate assets. The probate court found that
eight of the accounts were survivorship accounts and passed to the joint ten-
ant, with the other five accounts passing under the will. The co-executor
acting on behalf of the estate appealed. The appeals court found that the
eight accounts that the probate court determined were survivorship accounts
contained sufficient language creating the right of survivorship. 67 The ap-
peals court also determined that the five accounts that the probate court
determined were probate assets did not create survivorship rights because of
the language on the signature cards for these accounts. 68
III. HEIRSHIP
In Buster v. Metropolitan Transit Authority 69 the court determined that a
probate court's determination of appellant's status as a decedent's spouse in
a determination of heirship proceeding did not preclude litigation concern-
ing the existence of a common law marriage in a wrongful death action.70
The decedent died as the result of injuries she suffered when a bus hit her
car. The Metropolitan Transit Authority admitted liability and interpled the
settlement funds because the decedent's mother asserted that she was the
decedent's only statutory beneficiary, while the decedent's alleged common
64. Id. at 727. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 448 (Vernon 1980) provides protection from
liability to any financial institution that distributes funds pursuant to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§§ 444-447. The bank distributed the funds to the decedent's sister pursuant to TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 445, so the court determined that the bank had no liability to the decedent's
heirs. 840 S.W.2d at 727. The court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the bank. Id.
65. 857 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
66. Id. at 751.
67. Id. The court found that the decedent signed the signature cards on these eight ac-
counts and that the signature cards contained language that clearly created survivorship rights.
Id.
68. Id. One of the accounts stated specifically that it was a tenancy in common account,
not a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The signature card for one of the accounts did
not have the box designating the account as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship marked.
The signature cards for two of the remaining accounts did not have any language creating a
right of survivorship other than the designation as joint account with right of survivorship.
The language on the signature card for the remaining account did not indicate the type of
account.
69. 835 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
70. Id. at 237-38.
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law husband asserted that he should receive the settlement funds. The al-
leged common law husband filed an application for determination of heir-
ship in the decedent's estate and the probate court found that a common law
marriage existed and that decedent's common law husband was her only
heir. The court in the interpleader action determined that the transit au-
thority could litigate the issue of the common law marriage. The common
law husband appealed, based on his contention that relitigation of the exist-
ence of the common law marriage is a collateral attack on the probate
court's judgment. The appeals court found that the record failed to demon-
strate that the issue of the common law marriage was fully developed in the
determination of heirship proceeding and that nothing in the record revealed
that the transit authority had its interests represented in the heirship deter-
mination. 71 The court also found that the Wrongful Death Act, not the
Probate Code, identifies the class of persons who may sue for wrongful
death, so the issue of the common law marriage was properly before the
court in the interpleader action. 72
In Turner v. Nesby 73 the court determined that the statute of limitations
for a bill of review in an heirship determination had passed prior to the time
the appellee filed the bill of review. 74 The appellee, who claimed to be the
decedent's illegitimate child, filed a bill of review of the heirship determina-
tion more than seven years after the court entered its judgment determining
heirship. At the time that the court determined heirship, the appellee could
not inherit from his alleged natural father under section 42(b) of the Probate
Code. 75 The appeals court first determined that section 42(b), at the time of
the decedent's death, was unconstitutional as it applied to the appellee be-
cause he could not establish his heirship. 76 The court then determined that
although the original application for determination of heirship was defective,
the court still had jurisdiction to render judgment. 77 The court finally deter-
mined that the statute of limitations for any bill of review resulting from the
heirship determination expired four years following the date of the
determination.78
71. Id. at 237.
72. Id. at 237-38.
73. 848 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
74. Id. at 877-78.
75. Act of May 17, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 713, § 5, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1740, 1742
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legislature
has amended § 42(b) twice since the date of the decedent's death, with the first amendment
allowing hearings after a decedent's death for the purpose of determining paternity. Act of
May 30, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 464, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2051.
76. 848 S.W.2d at 875.
77. Id. at 876. The jurat on the affidavit attached to the application for determination of
heirship incorrectly substituted the word "affidavit" for the word "application."
78. Id. at 877-78. The trial court had determined that the alleged natural son had four
years following the revision to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) to file his bill of review. The
court of appeals rejected this argument because the alleged natural son could have directly
appealed from the original judgment based on constitutional grounds. 848 S.W.2d at 877. The
court of appeals further stressed that the state's interest in orderly administration and distribu-
tion of estates bars appellee's claims due to the length of time that had passed from the date of
the original determination of heirship to the date appellee filed his bill of review. Id. at 877-78.
1994] 1727
SMU LAW REVIEW
In Matherson v. Pope79 the court held that paternal collateral relatives
may inherit from an illegitimate child. 80 The decedent, who died intestate,
was single and had no surviving descendants at the time of his death. The
decedent's mother was unmarried at the time of his birth, although she later
married and her husband raised the decedent from the time that he was
small. Prior to the decedent's birth his mother was involved in a relation-
ship with a man who later married her cousin and had four children. The
court heard testimony in the determination of heirship proceeding concern-
ing decedent's relationship with both men and rendered judgment that dece-
dent's biological father was Pope, the man who later married his mother's
first cousin, and that decedent's heirs were Pope's three surviving children
and the child of Pope's deceased child. The decedent's maternal first cousins
appealed the decision on the basis that section 42(b)(1) of the Probate
Code"' does not permit the collateral relatives to prove paternity. The ap-
peals court found that the legislature intended to allow collateral relatives to
inherit from illegitimate children under the first sentence of section
42(b)(1)8 2 because of the wording of the last clause of the sentence.83 The
appeals court also held that although the probate court did not expressly find
that the alleged biological father did not receive the decedent in his home
appellants failed either to request the probate court to include this finding or
to object to the probate court's failure to make the finding prior to the
appeal.8 4
In McMahan v. Naylor8 5 the court found that an alleged biological son
incorrectly filed a petition to determine heirship when the decedent died tes-
tate and with no intestate estate.8 6 The decedent executed a will in 1975, in
which he named his three children. At the time the decedent executed the
will his alleged biological son was almost eighteen years old. The decedent
made no reference to the alleged biological son in his will. The decedent
died in 1992 and the county court admitted his will to probate. The alleged
biological son then filed a petition to determine heirship in order to establish
paternity and to claim a share of the estate under the decedent's will. Dece-
dent's three children filed a motion for summary judgment in which they
79. 852 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
80. Id. at 290.
81. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
82. Id.
83. 852 S.W.2d at 290. The first sentence of TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1993) provides that ascendants, descendants, and collateral relatives may inherit from a
biological child if any of the four methods listed in the first sentence establish paternity of the
child. The appeals court found that collaterals may prove paternity under any of the four
methods listed in the first sentence of TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1). 852 S.W.2d at 290.
The court found that collateral relatives do not have the right to establish paternity under the
second and third sentences of TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b)(1) since the legislature specified
that only alleged biological children or persons inheriting through alleged biological children
may use this method to establish paternity. 852 S.W.2d at 289.
84. 852 S.W.2d at 290. The appeals court found that the probate court presumptively
found that the alleged biological father received the decedent in his home in support of its
determination of heirship. Id. at 291.
85. 855 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
86. Id. at 194-95.
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asserted that the statute of limitations under section 13.01(a) of the Family
Code8 7 barred the alleged son's petition and his efforts to establish paternity,
that a suit to determine paternity does not survive the death of the alleged
biological father,8 8 and that the alleged biological son incorrectly brought
the petition under section 48 of the Probate Code89 since the decedent had
no intestate estate. The appeals court found that, although the alleged bio-
logical son may have a valid argument attacking section 13.01(a) of the
Family Code,90 he filed his petition under section 48 of the Probate Code,91
which applies only to intestate situations. 92 The appeals court affirmed the
trial court's summary judgment because the alleged biological son filed an
incorrect proceeding based on the facts of the case.93
IV. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. JURISDICTION
In Palmer v. Coble Wall Trust Co. 94 the court considered the extent of a
statutory probate court's jurisdiction under the provisions of Texas Probate
Code section 5A(b) 95 as it existed in 1985.96 The court found that in 1985
the statutory probate court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district
court to consider causes of action filed by independent administrators
against temporary administrators. 97 The dissent argued that the legislature
did not contemplate a personal representative's case against a former per-
sonal representative for the causes of action included in this case.98
In Strawder v. Thomas99 the court held that the trial court did not have in
personam jurisdiction over a Louisiana administratrix when a Texas court
87. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ch. 13 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
89. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 48 (Vernon 1980).
90. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
91. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 48 (Vernon 1980).
92. 855 S.W.2d at 194.
93. Id. at 195.
94. 851 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. 1992). For a complete discussion of this case, see Lynne M.
Candler, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 1831, 1846-47
(1993).
95. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
96. 851 S.W.2d at 179.
97. Id. at 182-83. Prior to the decedent's death the probate court appointed the trust
company guardian of her estate. The guardian developed an estate plan for the ward, which
the probate court approved. Following the ward's death the probate court appointed the trust
company as temporary administrator of her estate and thereafter appointed an independent
administrator of the estate. The independent administrator sued the trust company in the
probate court for negligence, gross negligence, and violation of the deceptive trades practices
act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994), based on the
complexity and cost of the estate plan. The probate court entered judgment for the independ-
ent administrator. The appeals court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of the trust
company, finding that the probate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the suit
because the causes of action were not appertaining to or incident to the estate. Coble Wall
Trust Co. v. Palmer, 848 S.W.2d 696, 701-02 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), rev'd, 851
S.W.2d 178 (Tex. 1992).
98. 851 S.W.2d at 183-85 (Cornyn, J., dissenting).
99. 846 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
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had not appointed her as administrator of the decedent's estate and she had
not filed for ancillary probate of the decedent's estate."0° The decedent died
as the result of a pipeline explosion. Following the decedent's death a Loui-
siana court appointed an administratrix of his estate. The administratrix
filed suit individually and as administratrix against the owners of the pipe-
line in a Texas court. The administratrix never qualified as administratrix of
the decedent's estate in Texas and never initiated an ancillary probate of the
decedent's estate in Texas. The Louisiana court subsequently removed the
administratrix and appointed a successor administratrix of the decedent's
estate. The original administratrix alleged that she settled her suit against
the pipeline company, although the only copy of the settlement agreement
named her in her individual capacity and did not contain signatures on be-
half of the pipeline company. The successor administratrix later brought
suit against the pipeline company in a Louisiana court. The original admin-
istratrix , still reciting her capacity as administratrix of the estate, filed a
motion with the Texas court for payment of the settlement funds to the reg-
istry of the court pending the outcome of a dispute between her counsel and
counsel for the successor administratrix. Some time later, the original ad-
ministratrix, still alleging her capacity as administratrix, petitioned the
Texas court for appointment of an attorney ad litem to represent the dece-
dent's minor son's interests in the settlement. The successor administratrix
filed an opposition to the motion requesting the deposit of the funds into the
court's registry and filed an intervention in the Texas suit. The successor
administratrix attempted to file a nonsuit in the Texas case by facsimile
transmission, which the court clerk stamped and entered into the record.
The procedural history of the Texas case from that point is quite compli-
cated, but the Texas court ultimately awarded the original administratrix the
sum of $400,000 from the successor administratrix for attorney's fees, plus
some additional attorney's fees. The attorney ad litem later requested the
Texas court to modify the judgment awarding attorney's fees since it did not
address the ad litem fees, and the court signed a new judgment, which did
not purport to modify the former judgment, but which added language al-
lowing payment of the ad litem's fees. The Texas court denied the successor
administratrix's motion for new trial and she appealed. The appeals court
determined, among other things, that neither the original administratrix nor
the successor administratrix could bring suit in Texas against each other
since neither was appointed administratrix by a Texas court. 10'
The court in Coppock & Teltschik v. Mayor, Day & Caldwell 10 2 held that
the statutory probate court had subject matter jurisdiction over a suit against
the temporary administrator of an estate because the causes of action had to
do with the temporary administrator's actions while serving as fiduciary and
the disposition of one of the estate's major assets.'03 The temporary admin-
100. Id. at 64.
101. Id.
102. 857 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
103. Id. at 636. Further, the plaintiffs challenged the probate court's orders and the ac-
tions of the temporary administrator's attorneys. Id.
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istrator, with the probate court's approval, obtained a loan on behalf of the
estate, which he secured with one of the estate's major assets. The lender
was a client of the law firm of which the temporary administrator was a
partner. The decedent's wife, who had previously served as a temporary
administrator of the estate, assigned part of her interest in the estate to her
attorneys. The probate court approved the temporary administrator's final
account and discharged the temporary administrator from all liability in
connection with the administration of the estate. The decedent's wife later
filed suit against the lender in district court, and her attorneys filed an inter-
pleader action in her suit. The temporary administrator intervened in the
suit and the probate court transferred the case from district court. The pro-
bate court granted the temporary administrator's motion for summary judg-
ment. The wife's attorneys, based on their assigned interest in the estate,
appealed on several grounds, including the ground that the probate court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The appeals court found
that each action that formed the basis of the suit filed by the wife's attorneys
occurred while the temporary administrator was acting in his fiduciary ca-
pacity. 10 4 Because the causes of action directly arose out of the temporary
administrator's fiduciary actions, the causes of action were incident to the
estate and the probate court had jurisdiction. 10 5
B. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
In Rooke v. Jenson 106 the court held that the statute of limitations would
not serve as a defense to an executor who undertook her fiduciary position
with knowledge that someone had filed a claim prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations against the individual named in the will as the dece-
dent's first choice to serve as executor. 10 7 The decedent's automobile col-
lided with the plaintiff in 1986. The plaintiff filed suit against the decedent
within the two year statute of limitations, but she learned that the decedent
had died when she attempted to serve him. The plaintiff then substituted the
decedent's widow, who his will named as executor and sole beneficiary, as
the defendant. The widow had not offered the will for probate and had not
qualified as executor at the time the plaintiff substituted her as defendant.
The widow attempted to file the will as a muniment of title, but the plaintiff
filed a motion for appointment of a personal representative. The court ap-
pointed the decedent's daughter to serve as executor at the daughter's re-
quest. The statute of limitations had expired at the time the court appointed
the daughter as executor. The plaintiff amended the petition and named the
daughter in her capacity as executor as defendant. The daughter moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the statute of limitations had elapsed.
The trial court granted her motion and the appeals court affirmed.' 08 The
104. Id. at 635.
105. Id. at 636.
106. 838 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1992).
107. Id. at 230.




supreme court held that the executor could not assert the defense of limita-
tions since she knew of the existence of the suit and that her mother, the
executor named in the will, was the named defendant in the suit in her fidu-
ciary capacity. 10 9
In In re Estate of Spindort 10 the court held that the independent executor
properly sought court approval for the partition and distribution of the es-
tates.It' The two decedents, a married couple, died within a few months of
each other. The husband died first, leaving his property to his wife, who
disclaimed it. The independent executor of both estates filed applications in
the county court for approval of a partition of the two estates between the
couple's three children, or, alternatively, for the court to order a partition
pursuant to the Probate Code.1 12 The county court transferred the estates to
the district court, which interpreted the language of the wills and determined
that the independent executor did not have the authority to make the pro-
posed partition. The wills provided for equal distribution of the balance of
the estates to the three children. The wills further provided that the in-
dependent executor was to divide the estate equally. The wills did not con-
tain provisions controlling the resolution of conflicts concerning the division
of the estate. The district court transferred the estates back to the county
court for a partition of the estates. One of the children appealed. The court
of appeals found that the wills did not provide a method of partitioning the
estate, so that section 150 of the Probate Code' 13 applied, even though the
estates were under independent administrations.' 14 The court held that the
independent executor correctly requested the court to approve the proposed
partition." 15 The court also found that the district court correctly inter-
preted the two wills as providing no method for resolution of conflicts be-
tween the executor and beneficiaries over the partition of the state." 16
In Wetsel v. Perry 117 the court found that an independent executor must
receive personal service of notice of a suit to remove her as executor. 18 The
decedent's widow, who was not a beneficiary under his will, brought an ac-
tion to remove the independent executor. The independent executor's attor-
ney received service of the notice of the removal action, but no service was
personally made on the independent executor. The independent executor
did not appear at the hearing, at which the court removed her. She then
109. 838 S.W.2d at 230. The court made its decision without hearing oral argument, re-
versed the court of appeals, and remanded the case to the trial court. Id.
110. 840 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, no writ).
111. Id. at 667.
112. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 373-387 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1994).
113. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 150 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
114. 840 S.W.2d at 667.
115. Id.
116. Id. On motion for rehearing, the court amended the district court's order to delete the
reference to distribution of undivided interests in the estates since the wills specifically in-
structed the executor to divide the estates between the three children. Id.
117. 842 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
118. Id. at 375. The court's actions in removing the independent executor without per-
sonal service violated her due process rights. Id.
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appealed. The court of appeals found that Probate Code sections 149C(a) 119
and 222(b) 120 contain specific language that require personal service on the
personal representative. 12 1 The court concluded that the specific language of
these two sections overrode the language of Probate Code sections 33122 and
34123 and required personal service on an independent executor before the
court may remove her. 124
In Ward v. Property Tax Valuation, Inc. 125 the court held that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment against an independent executor
in his individual capacity. 126 The independent executor entered into a writ-
ten agreement with the appellee on behalf of the estate for appealing an ad
valorem tax assessment. The agreement specifically named the estate as the
owner of the property subject to the agreement and the independent execu-
tor signed the agreement on behalf of the estate as independent executor.
Almost a year after the parties entered the agreement the appellee filed suit
against the independent executor individually and in his capacity as executor
for payment of fees under the agreement. The trial court granted the appel-
lee's summary judgment against the independent executor, both individually
and as independent executor. The independent executor appealed the sum-
mary judgment entered against him individually. The appeals court found
that the agreement clearly indicated, as a matter of law, that the appellee
could look only to the executor in his fiduciary capacity for payment. 127
In Bernstein v. Portland Say. & Loan 128 the court found that a judgment
entered against an estate was valid against the independent executor. 129 The
jury found that the decedent committed conspiracy, fraud, and conversion
and the court entered judgment against the decedent's estate since he died
prior to the trial. The estate appealed on a number of grounds, including the
ground that the judgment was void because it held the estate liable for dam-
ages. The appeals court agreed that an estate is not a proper party to litiga-
tion since it is not a legal entity. 130 The personal representative participated
in the litigation, however, so the judgment bound the personal representative
119. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994) has to do with the removal
of an independent executor.
120. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 222(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994) has to do with the removal of
a personal representative following notice.
121. 842 S.W.2d at 375.
122. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 33 (Vernon 1980) has to do with the service of notices in
probate actions.
123. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 34 (Vernon 1980) has to do with service on a party's
attorney.
124. 842 S.W.2d at 375.
125. 847 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
126. Id. at 299, 301.
127. Id. at 300.
128. 850 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
129. Id. at 700.
130. Id. at 699 (citing Henson v. Estate of Crow, 734 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987)). The
personal representative of the estate, or the heirs or beneficiaries, if appropriate, would be the
proper party or parties to litigation. See 850 S.W.2d at 699 (citing Price v. Estate of Anderson,
522 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1975)).
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even though it incorrectly named the estate.13 1
In Vineyard v. Irvin 132 the court determined that an order of sale of real
property under section 338 of the Probate Code133 is a final order subject to
appeal t34 and that the co-executors did not have to post a supersedeas bond
to suspend the order of sale.13 5 The decedent's estate owed a debt secured
by a deed of trust on real property. The creditor reduced the debt to judg-
ment and filed a claim against the estate. The creditor then filed an applica-
tion for order of public sale of the real property under Probate Code section
338,136 which the court ordered. The co-executors requested the court to
allow them to file a supersedeas bond to postpone the order of sale while
they appealed the order. The court did not allow the co-executors to file the
bond and they appealed. The court of appeals first found that the order of
sale under section 338 differs from a post-judgment writ of execution because
the court must enter a separate order allowing the sale of the real property
under section 338.137 The court determined that the order of sale is a final
order because it conclusively and finally determines that a sale of estate
property will occur, as well as the method of the sale.' 38 The court next
determined that the court of appeals might issue a writ of mandamus com-
pelling the trial court to set the amount of a supersedeas bond. 139 The co-
executors contended on appeal that the requirement of posting bond did not
apply to them and that they could suspend the sale without posting bond.
The court of appeals examined section 29 of the Probate Code, 140 which
provides that personal representatives do not have to post bond in appeals
unless the appeal personally concerns the personal representative.' 41 The
131. 850 S.W.2d at 700. The court found that a judgment naming an estate may bind the
personal representative if the personal representative appears and acts in the case. Id. at 699
(citing Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d at 692; Dueitt v. Dueitt, 802 S.W.2d 859, 861
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)).
132. 855 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
133. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 338 (Vernon 1980) governs the sale of mortgaged property
at the creditor's request.
134. 855 S.W.2d at 211.
135. Id. at 212.
136. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 338 (Vernon 1980).
137. 855 S.W.2d at 210. The court also found that a sale under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 338 (Vernon 1980) requires continuing court supervision under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§§ 331-358 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1994).
138. 855 S.W.2d at 210-11. The subsequent order confirming the sale would not address
the issues decided in the initial order of sale, but merely confirm the details of the sale. The
court thus determined that the order of sale is a final order that the executors may appeal. Id.
at 211.
139. Id. at 211. TEX. R. App. P. 47(d) allows the owner of real property to suspend fore-
closure on the real property by posting security. The trial court ordinarily does not have
discretion to refuse to set the amount of the supersedeas bond. 855 S.W.2d at 211 (citing
Oldfield v. Lester, 144 Tex. 1112, 188 S.W.2d 982, 982 (1945); Elizondo v. Williams, 643
S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ); Amalgamated Transit Union v.
Dallas Public Transit Board, 430 S.W.2d 107, 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969)).
140. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 29 (Vernon 1980).
141. 855 S.W.2d at 211. The court also relied on Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381
S.W.2d 478, 480-82 (Tex. 1964). The Ammex court determined that the State could suspend
judgment without filing a supersedeas bond based upon the general exemption granted to the
State for filing bonds under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2276 (Vernon 1971) (repealed).
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court chose not to construe section 29 of the Probate Code 142 any more
narrowly than its predecessor statute 143 or the current law exempting state
and federal agencies from filing bond on appeal' 4 and held that the co-
executors could suspend the order of sale without posting a supersedeas
bond. 145
In Bank One Texas, NA. v. Ameritrust Texas, NA. 146 the court examined
the Substitute Fiduciary Act 147 to determine which of two fiduciaries re-
ceived the right to serve as executor under a decedent's will. 148 The dece-
dent named MBank Dallas as independent executor of his 1986 will. The
legislature passed the Substitute Fiduciary Act 149 in 1987. MCorp was a
bank holding company that owned all of the stock of MCorp Financial,
which owned MBank Dallas, and MVestment Corp., which owned MTrust
Corp. MCorp filed appropriate documentation with the banking commis-
sioner in 1987 and thereafter substituted MTrust as fiduciary for MBank
Dallas. In 1989 the FDIC became receiver for MBank Dallas and trans-
ferred the assets to Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, N.A. The purchase and
assumption agreement between Bridge Bank and FDIC provided for the
transfer of all fiduciary appointments to which MBank Dallas was named in
will and other documents. Bank One, Texas, N.A. acquired Bridge Bank
later in 1989. Ameritrust Corporation purchased all of the stock of MVest-
ment Corp. and MTrust Corp. in 1990, based on a purchase agreement the
parties entered in October 1989. Ameritrust then filed an instrument of as-
sumption with the banking commissioner, in which it assumed all of the
liabilities and obligations under MCorp's documentation in connection with
the substitution of fiduciary appointments. The decedent died in October
1989, prior to the time Ameritrust entered the purchase agreement with
MCorp. Ameritrust filed an application for probate and for issuance of let-
ters testamentary and the probate court admitted the will to probate. Amer-
itrust asked the probate court to declare that Ameritrust was the proper
executor under the Substitute Fiduciary Act. 150 Bank One answered and
Article 2276 provided that the State of Texas and its various arms, as well as personal repre-
sentatives of estates, while acting in their fiduciary capacities, were not required to give bond
on appeal. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2276 (Vernon 1971) (repealed). TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 29 (Vernon 1980) codifies the former statute's provisions relating to personal
representatives of estates.
142. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 29 (Vernon 1980).
143. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2276 (Vernon 1971) (repealed).
144. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1986), which exempts state
and federal agencies from posting bonds on appeal. The Texas Supreme Court recently held
that the Ammex holding applies to state and federal agencies under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 6.001 (Vernon 1986). Richards v. Mena, 820 S.W.2d 371, 371 (Tex. 1991).
145. 855 S.W.2d at 212.
146. 858 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
147. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 548h (Vernon Supp. 1994).
148. 858 S.W.2d at 519-21.
149. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 548h (Vernon Supp. 1994). The act provides that,
under certain conditions, a subsidiary trust company may serve as substitute fiduciary for an
affiliate bank named in the will or trust agreement. In order to serve the bank holding com-
pany that owns the trust company and affiliated banks must file an irrevocable undertaking of




counterclaimed, urging that it was the proper executor at the time of the
decedent's death due to the purchase and assumption agreement between
FDIC and Bank One. The probate court granted summary judgment for
Ameritrust and denied Bank One's motion for summary judgment. The ap-
peals court found that Ameritrust was the proper executor by reading the
will and the statute together.' 51 The court also found that the Substitute
Fiduciary Act' 52 is constitutional. 53
C. CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
In Kuenstler v. Trevino ' 4 the court affirmed the executor's obligation to
pay a claim to the creditor on a note secured by a truck that the decedent
purchased shortly before his death, 155 but found that the decedent's at-
tempted gift of the vehicle was ineffective.' 56 The decedent purchased the
truck through a down payment and a loan. The decedent purported to give
the truck to another person through a gift deed, which did not recite
whether the donee would assume the liability on the debt. The decedent
made the first payment on the note and the donee made the next two pay-
ments. The decedent then died and the donee advised the executor at the
funeral that she would continue to make the payments on the note. The
donee failed to continue the payments, however, and the bank repossessed
the vehicle. The donee filed a petition with the probate court for a declara-
tory judgment against the estate and the bank, in which she alleged that she
owned the truck and that the estate had the obligation to pay the note. The
bank filed a claim and petitioned the court to order the executor to pay the
amount remaining on the note. The trial court denied the estate's motion for
summary judgment and found that the decedent gave the truck to the donee
and that the estate was liable on the note. The trial court ordered the execu-
tor to pay the amount due on the note and to transfer title on the vehicle to
the donee. The executor appealed. The appeals court first found that the
executor could not appeal the trial court's order denying her motion for
summary judgment because it was an interlocutory order. 15 7 The court next
found that the decedent could not give the donee all interest in the truck
151. 858 S.W.2d at 519-20. The will named MBank Dallas and its successors as executor.
The court found that MTrust was successor to MBank Dallas through the Substitute Fiduci-
ary Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 548h, §§ 2(d) and 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994). The
court found that on the date of the substitution agreement, in 1987, MBank transferred a
valuable property right in connection with the decedent's will to MTrust. 858 S.W.2d at 520.
Bank One had contended that MBank had no property interest in connection with its appoint-
ment under the will in 1987, but the court did not find this argument persuasive. Id.
152. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 548h (Vernon Supp. 1994).
153. 858 S.W.2d at 521. The court found that the decedent had constructive notice that
the legislature enacted the act and of its provisions. Id. The decedent could have revised his
will to change executor had he so chosen, but, by not doing so, he in effect allowed the substi-
tution under the act. Id. The court also found that another court, in In re Estate of Touring,
775 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ), had previously found the
statute constitutional. 858 S.W.2d at 521.
154. 836 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).
155. Id. at 719.
156. Id. at 718.
157. Id. at 717.
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since his interest was subject to the indebtedness. 5 8 Finally, the court held
that the trial court had jurisdiction to order the executor to pay the debt
even though the estate was under independent administration.1 59
In In re Estate of Wallock 160 the court determined that the trial court
erred in classifying a claim filed more than three years after the original
grant of letters testamentary as a class 7 claim. 16' The decedent was a gen-
eral partner in a partnership formed to acquire real property. The partner-
ship and each of the partners executed a non-recourse note to finance the
purchase of the real estate. The decedent and his wife died at or about the
same time and the court probated their wills together. The court appointed
independent co-executors of the two estates, who served for about two years.
Two of the executors resigned, and the court converted the estates to depen-
dent administration and appointed the remaining executor as administrator
of the estates. Within six months after the court originally granted letters of
administration in the dependent administration the bank from which the
partnership acquired the financing from the property filed an authenticated
secured claim against both estates. The bank filed its claim as a preferred
debt and lien against the partnership property. The dependent administrator
allowed and the court approved the claim. One of the former general part-
ners, which had withdrawn from the partnership and filed for reorganization
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 162 during the pendency of the
administration of the estates, conveyed part of the real property to the bank
in satisfaction of the debt. The former partner claimed that the decedent
defaulted and amended the bank's claim to an unsecured claim and re-
quested that the court retain the classification as a class 7 debt. 163 The de-
pendent administrator allowed the claim and the court approved the claim
as a class 7 claim under section 322 of the Probate Code. 164 Other creditors
of the estates appealed the court's decision. The appeals court first found
that the other creditors could appeal by writ of error. 165 The court then
determined that the former partner could not acquire the status of the bank's
claim through subrogation.' 66 The court held that the former partners
158. Id. at 718. The court could find no evidence that the decedent intended to make
future payments on the note after the date of the gift. Id.
159. Id. at 718-19.
160. 846 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
161. Id. at 541.
162. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1330 (1988, Supp. 11 1990, Supp. III 1991, Supp. IV 1992).
163. The former partner argued subrogation, contribution, and indemnity.
164. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Claims presented more than six
months after the court originally granted letters of administration or testamentary are class 8
claims. Id.
165. 846 S.W.2d at 540. The court noted that an appellant may proceed by writ of error if
the appellant is a party to the suit who brings the writ within six months of the judgment, but
who did not participate at the trial, and the face of the record plainly reflects the error. Id. at
539. The court found that the creditors brought the writ within six months of the order and
that they were interested parties. Id. at 540. The court then determined that the other credi-
tors did not participate at the trial since the only action that they had taken was filing claims
and that the court did not hold a hearing prior to approving the former partner's claim. Id.
166. Id. The court first found that the trial court vacated its order approving the bank's
claim when it approved the former partner's claim and that it had no jurisdiction to do so. Id.
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should have an accounting to allocate profits and losses to fix the amount of
the claim, so the trial court erred in approving the full amount of the
claim. 167
In Ertel v. O'Brien 168 the court found that a corporate co-executor
breached its fiduciary duty by not paying a timely presented unsecured
claim.169 The decedent and his wife leased an airplane on a monthly lease
with an obligation to purchase the airplane at the end of the lease term. The
decedent notified the lessor that he intended to transfer the aircraft to a cor-
poration in which he held an ownership interest. The decedent and the cor-
poration never entered a written agreement for the transfer of the aircraft. A
partnership in which the decedent was a partner made monthly payments on
the airplane from the time that the decedent informed the lessor of the trans-
fer until several months following the decedent's death. The court appointed
the decedent's wife and the bank as co-executors and the bank assumed all of
the decedent's records and managed the estate. The lessor demanded pay-
ment of the purchase price for the airplane, or, in the alternative, the execu-
tion of a new lease-purchase agreement, within six months after the court
issued letters testamentary. The bank failed to pay the lessor anything on
the lessor's claim, although it subsequently paid itself more than $126,000 in
unsecured claims and paid other unsecured creditors more than $50,000.
The bank resigned as co-executor, after which the lessor sued the bank and
the decedent's wife individually and as co-executors of the estate for failure
to pay the claim and for breach of the lease. 170 The trial court found that
the lessor timely presented his claim and that the bank did not breach its
fiduciary duty to the lessor, but that the bank was negligent in failing to
enter an agreement transferring the airplane to the corporation. The trial
court also found that the bank did not breach its fiduciary duty by failing to
set aside funds to pay the claim in the event the corporation breached the
contract. The lessor appealed on the basis that the trial court incorrectly
found that the bank did not breach its fiduciary and statutory duties. The
appeals court noted that a higher standard of care applies to a corporate
fiduciary than to an individual because of its professional status' 7 ' and found
that the bank breached its fiduciary and statutory duties by not paying the
lessor's claim.' 72 The appeals court further found that the lessor presented
his claim in a timely manner and that the executor should have paid this
The court found that the former partner did not acquire the bank's claim through subrogation
because the bank no longer had a claim once it received the property in satisfaction of the debt,
so the former partner did not acquire the bank's claim. Id. The partnership agreement con-
trolled the allocation of the loss on the property among the partners, so the former partner
should have brought the claim against the estates only after a partnership accounting. Id. at
541.
167. Id.
168. 852 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
169. Id. at 21.
170. The lessor also sued the corporation based on the conversation with the decedent
concerning the transfer of the airplane and the obligation to the corporation. The trial court
found that statute of frauds barred the lessor's claims against the corporation.
171. Id. at 20.
172. Id. at 21. The court also found that the trial court erred in its determination that the
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claim either when the executor paid the other unsecured creditors or upon
the termination of the lease. 173
In Goins v. League Bank & Trust 174 the court determined that a bank
timely filed a claim in an estate and that the bank elected to proceed under
section 306(a)(2) of the Probate Code 175 in connection with the claim. 176
The bank filed an authenticated claim with the administrator of the dece-
dent's estate. The administrator, who was the decedent's wife, did not re-
spond to the claim, and the bank filed suit against the administrator.177 The
bank made a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted,
then later amended. The administrator appealed, claiming that the trial
court granted relief to the bank that the bank had not requested in its motion
for summary judgment. The trial court ordered the clerk to classify the
bank's claim as a matured, secured claim, fixed as a preferred debt and lien
against the real property under section 306(a)(2) of the Probate Code. 178
The bank requested the court to enter judgment on the claims docket as a
matured, secured claim, which the court of appeals found sufficient to show
that the bank elected to proceed under section 306(a)(2) of the Probate
Code 179 and that the trial court granted the relief the bank requested under
its election. 80
D. ESTATE DISTRIBUTIONS
In Cullen Center Bank & Trust v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. 181 the
court held that the marital trust should receive both income and principal
earned on an account the co-executors established to protect the marital
trust from estate and inheritance taxes. 182 The original co-executors of the
decedent's estate brought a declaratory judgment for construction of the will
since the decedent purported to bequeath more than 100% of his estate in
the will and its codicils. The court determined that the testamentary marital
bank's negligent handling of the lessor's claim did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
Id.
173. Id. The court found that if the estate did not have adequate funds to pay all of the
claims of the same class as the lessor's claim, the bank should have paid the claims pro rata.
Id. The court also found that the bank failed to act in good faith when it determined that the
corporation had assumed the obligation and that the claim was no longer valid. Id. Even if
the bank had acted in good faith, however, the bank could not use the good faith as a defense
to breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 22 (citing Slay v. Burnett Trust Co., 143 Tex. 621, 187
S.W.2d 377, 377 (1945)).
174. 857 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
175. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(a)(2) (Vernon 1980).
176. 857 S.W.2d at 631.
177. The administrator and her husband executed a promissory note secured by a deed of
trust. The decision is unclear whether the administrator was sued solely in her individual
capacity, see 857 S.W.2d at 629, or both individually and as administrator of the estate. See id.
at 630.
178. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(a)(2) (Vernon 1980). This section provides that a
claimant must state whether it requested to have the claim, once allowed and approved, fixed
as preferred debt and lien against the real property that secures the indebtedness.
179. Id.
180. 857 S.W.2d at 631.
181. 841 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
182. Id. at 126.
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trust should receive 26% of the decedent's estate. The will provided that the
decedent's widow should receive all of the income from the marital trust
during her lifetime. The trial court determined, as part of the will construc-
tion, that the marital trust should receive its percentage of the estate without
liability for estate and inheritance taxes, and any penalties and interest on
estate tax. The co-executors elected to pay the estate tax in installments
under section 6166 of the Internal Revenue Code. 18 3 The co-executors
wished to preserve the marital deduction for the marital trust, since the mar-
ital deduction resulted in a significant tax savings to the estate.' 8 4 The co-
executors consulted with several experts and decided to create an account to
receive the marital trust's share of each dollar used to pay taxes or penalties
or interest on the taxes.' 8 5 The co-executors delivered all of the income
earned on the account set aside for the marital trust to the trust in 1986,
1987, and 1988. The co-executors determined to make the same distribution
in 1989, but did not do so, apparently because of their involvement with
litigation concerning the estate. The co-executors again did not distribute
income earned on the account in 1990. No one paid taxes on the account's
income for 1989 and 1990, resulting in a large deficiency to Internal Revenue
Service. As a condition of the settlement agreement reached by the parties
to the litigation the co-executors resigned. The trustees of the marital trust
applied to the court for partial distribution of the estate, requesting distribu-
tion of the funds in the account set aside for the benefit of the marital trust
and all income earned on the account. One of the other beneficiaries of the
estate objected to the distribution. The probate court approved the distribu-
tion and the objecting beneficiary appealed. The appeals court first refused
to consider the appellant's points of error concerning the amount of the dis-
tribution to the marital trust because the will construction action finally dis-
posed of these points of error years before.'8 6 The court then addressed
points of error concerning various findings of fact.' 8 7 The court noted that
the appellant did not challenge the trial court's conclusions of law that the
trustees were requesting a distribution of the property the will gave to the
trust and that all principal and income earned on the account belonged to
the marital trust.188
183. I.R.C. § 6166 (1986).
184. The decedent's net estate was worth almost $85 million, of which almost half would
go to taxes without the marital deduction. The marital deduction significantly lowered size of
the taxable estate.
185. The co-executors deposited 26 cents in the account for each 74 cents they paid in
estate and inheritance taxes, or in interest and penalties on the estate and inheritance taxes.
186. 841 S.W.2d at 121.
187. Id. at 122-26. The court found that uncontroverted evidence supported the trial
court's findings concerning the establishment of the account set aside for the marital trust, the
manner in which the co-executors set up the account and transferred funds into the account,
and the distributions from the account between 1986 and 1988. Id. at 122-23. The court also
found that the objecting beneficiary admitted that the principal of the account is the property
of the marital trust, so that the trial court did not err in making that finding of fact. Id. at 123.




In Henry v. LaGrone 189 the court determined that the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to allow the transfer of a pending case to a statu-
tory probate court in another county.190 Tarrant County Probate Court No.
2 appointed guardians of the person of the elderly ward in 1988. The court
found that no guardianship of the ward's estate was necessary since all of the
ward's property was held in trust for her benefit. The guardians of the per-
son reported in their 1990 annual report to the court that the trustee had
informed the nursing home in which the ward resided that she had no assets.
The court appointed an attorney ad litem to look into the extent of the
trust's assets. The attorney ad litem found that the trustee still held assets
for the benefit of the ward and that the trustee may have breached his fiduci-
ary duty to the ward. The attorney ad litem further recommended that the
court allow a suit for removal of the trustee. The court ordered the trustee
to pay the attorney ad litem's fees, which the trustee refused to do. The
attorney ad litem filed motions for contempt to compel the trustee to pay the
fees. The trustee moved to have the cause transferred from the Tarrant
County court to a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which
both the trustee resided and the ward's real property was located. The pro-
bate court denied the trustee's motion. The attorney ad litem then filed an
application to appoint a guardian of the ward's estate and the probate court
appointed him as guardian of the estate. The trustee filed a petition for de-
claratory judgment in the district court of the county in which he resided,
requesting the court to approve the trust and affirm transfers that the ward
made to the trustee. The guardians of the person and estate filed a motion to
transfer venue to Tarrant County, which the district court denied. The pro-
bate court entered an order transferring the district court suit to the probate
court and commanding the district clerk to deliver all pleadings and orders
concerning the district court action within ten days. The trustee filed an
application for a writ of prohibition in the district court, which the district
court granted and which prohibited the transfer of the cause from the dis-
trict court to the probate court. The guardians then filed application for writ
of mandamus, in which they requested the appeals court to order the district
court to withdraw the writ of prohibition and the district clerk to transfer
the cause of action. The court of appeals determined that the probate court
properly ordered the transfer of the cause of action.' 9 1
189. 842 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
190. Id. at 328.
191. Id. at 326-28. The court analyzed the four conditions that must exist to allow a statu-
tory probate court to transfer a cause of action to the probate court under TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 5B (Vernon Supp. 1993). The court first found that the court exercising the power to
transfer was a statutory probate court and that a cause of action was pending in a district
court, thus meeting the first and third conditions. 842 S.W.2d at 326. The court then found
that the second condition, that an estate is pending in the statutory probate court at the time of
the transfer, existed after the ad litem applied to the probate court for the appointment of a
guardian of the ward's estate. Id. at 326-27. Finally, the court found that the relief that the
trustee requested in his declaratory judgment cause of action was appertaining to or incident to
the estate pending in the probate court, satisfying the last condition. Id. at 327.
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In Hunter v. NCNB Texas National Bank 192 the court considered the is-
sue whether probate homestead protection applies to guardianship estates. 1 93
The ward executed a revocable living trust in 1985 and later conveyed her
homestead property to the trustee by warranty deed. The trust provided for
the ward during her lifetime and terminated upon her death, with the assets
to be distributed to her estate. The ward's daughter returned to live at the
residence in 1987 in order to care for her mother and the ward's sister. The
trial court established a guardianship for the ward in 1988, naming the
ward's son as guardian of both the person and estate of the ward. The son
moved the ward into a nursing home, but the ward's daughter and sister
continued living in the residence. The ward entered into a one year lease of
the residence with the trustee for 1989, but she refused to pay rent or sign a
new lease for 1990. The daughter alleged that she had a homestead interest
in the residence. The trustee filed a petition for declaratory judgment in
which it requested the trial court to determine whether the residence was a
part of the trust estate and subject to the Trustee's administration, or the
daughter's homestead. The trial court severed the daughter's cross action
against the guardian and counterclaim against the trustee and determined
that the daughter had no homestead interest in the residence property. The
court of appeals first found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it severed the homestead issue from other issues. 194 The court then
considered the daughter's claim that she had a homestead interest in the
property. 195 The court determined that the daughter could have no home-
stead interest in the property under sections 271 and 272 of the Probate
Code 96 until the death of the ward. 197
192. 857 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
193. Id. at 726.
194. Id. at 725. The court found that the trial court considered the daughter's counter-
claim on the homestead issue and that the remaining claims did not involve the issues or facts.
Id.
195. Id. at 726. The daughter based her claim on TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 271 (Vernon
Supp. 1994), which provides that the court may set aside exempt property for the benefit of the
decedent's surviving spouse, minor children, and unmarried children living with the family,
and TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 272 (Vernon Supp. 1993), which provides that the executor or
administrator of the decedent's estate shall deliver the homestead to the surviving spouse, if
any, or to the guardian of minor children and to unmarried children residing with the family.
The daughter argued that TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 108 (Vernon 1980), which provides that
Probate Code provisions applicable to decedent's estates shall also apply to guardianships un-
less they are inconsistent with guardianship provisions, should apply to TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. §§ 271-272 (Vernon Supp. 1994), thus giving her a homestead interest in the property.
196. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 271-272 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
197. 857 S.W.2d at 726. The court also found that the daughter had no homestead protec-
tion from creditors under TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (Vernon 1993), which did not provide
the daughter with a homestead interest in the property because no issue existed concerning the
forced sale of the property to settle debts. 857 S.W.2d at 726. The court further overruled the
daughter's argument that she had an inheritance right in the property that she would lose if
the trustee sold the property on the basis that the daughter did not have a right under the will





In Intertex, Inc. v. Kneisley 198 the court held that one judgment creditor
did not acquire title to real property under the foreclosure of a constructive
trust when the rights of other judgment lienholders were not before the
court that imposed the constructive trust. 199 The court in Exploration Co.
v. Vega Oil & Gas Co 20 0 did not impose a constructive trust because it
could find no fraud. 20 1 In Cherokee Water Co. v. Advance Oil & Gas Co.2
02
the court held that the two year statute of limitations 20 3 applied to actions
for a constructive trust arising from the sale of gas. 204  In Grace v.
198. 837 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
199. Id. at 137-38. Two creditors loaned a man money. The man and his wife resided at
the subject property as their homestead, but later abandoned the homestead. One creditor filed
suit against the man prior to the time the couple abandoned the homestead. The court entered
judgment for the creditor and he recorded the judgment. The couple then abandoned their
homestead and sold the property to a third party, who did not file the deed. The second
creditor then filed suit and received a default judgment that granted a constructive trust over
the property to the creditor. The second creditor filed the judgment in the property records
the day before the purchaser filed his deed. The second creditor bought the property at a
sheriff's sale. The first creditor assigned his judgment to a third party several years later and
the third party then bought the property at a constable's sale under a writ of execution on the
judgment it received from the first creditor. The assignee of the first creditor then filed a suit
to try title against the second creditor and his lessees. The trial court found that the first
creditor's lien never attached to the property due to its nature as homestead property at the
time the first creditor filed the lien and that the second creditor had a constructive trust on the
property. The appeals court found, among other things, that the first creditor did not partici-
pate in the trial in which the court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the second creditor
and the constructive trust could not, therefore, affect the interests of the first creditor or his
assignees. Id.
200. 843 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
201. Id. at 127. Two working interest owners conveyed three oil and gas leases and other
interests to the overriding royalty interest owner of the three leases in settlement of some
claims. The three leases in question had lapsed due to nonproduction almost a year before the
assignment. The assignment expressly stated that the assignors made no warranty concerning
any properties that had reverted due to lack of production. Following the assignment a third
party acquired new leases on the three properties and the assignee sued. The trial court en-
tered summary judgment for the new purchaser and the assignee appealed. The appeals court
first found that the new leases were not in extension of the three old leases because the old
leases had expired under their terms due to nonproduction before the purported assignment.
Id. at 125. Further, the new lessee was not an assignee of the former working interest owners.
Id. at 126. The appeals court then found that the new lessee did not owe the assignee a fiduci-
ary duty because of the assignment of the old leases. Id. Finally, the court found that no fraud
existed to justify the imposition of a constructive trust and, further, that the assignee never
alleged fraud. Id. at 127. Thus, the court did not impose a constructive trust. Id.
202. 843 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
203. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
204. 843 S.W.2d at 135. The appellant received clear title in 1982 to certain real property
that yielded mineral production after the conclusion of lengthy litigation. The lessees of the
mineral interests at the time of the conclusion of the litigation had entered into a pooling
agreement and sold gas from the pooled unit. The appellees continued to engage in ongoing
litigation with other parties concerning the ownership of the property, which concluded in the
appellee's favor several years later. Some six years after the appellee obtained clear title to the
surface it brought suit against the mineral lessees to recover for losses from the gas sold follow-
ing the pooling of the unit. The court held that the statute of limitations began in 1982 at the
conclusion of the original litigation, not at the later conclusion of the litigation with other
parties. Id. at 134. The court found that the statute of limitations barred the appellant's claim
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Zimmerman 20 the court did not impose a constructive trust because it
found neither evidence of a confidential relationship between the parties nor
fraud. 20 6 The court, in McAlpin v. Sanchez,207 held that the trial court cor-
rectly imposed a constructive trust over two oil leases,20 8 but found that the
trial court improperly determined the interests of the parties under the con-
structive trust.20 9
B. RESULTING TRUSTS
In Savell v. Savel1210 the court determined that the donor of property en-
grafted a resulting trust on the gift by orally informing the donees that he
intended the gifts to take effect upon his death.2 1' The appellant brought
suit against her brothers and the co-trustees of her mother's testamentary
trust for partition of real property. The appellant's father intervened, assert-
ing that he had a life estate in the property subject to the suit. After two
trials21 2 the trial court entered summary judgment for the appellant's father,
brothers, and the co-trustees, finding that only the appellant's father had a
present interest in the property. The appellant's mother left her interest in
the real property in question in trust for the benefit of her husband for his
since it did not file suit within two years of receiving clear title to the property and since it was
aware of the gas production in 1982. Id. at 135.
205. 853 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
206. Id. at 97. The cause of action arose when a purchaser of property from the FSLIC
attempted to obtain a wastewater capacity reservation. The owners and original developers of
the property failed to make payments and a bank foreclosed. The bank engaged a company to
continue the development, but the bank later failed and the FSLIC acquired the property.
When the purchaser from FSLIC attempted to obtain his wastewater reservation for the prop-
erty, the company hired by the bank asserted that only it had the right to obtain the reserva-
tion and that the new owner of the property could not obtain the wastewater capacity
assignment from FSLIC. The city granted the owner of the property the right to obtain the
wastewater capacity reservation. The company hired by the bank then sued the new owner
alleging several causes of action, including interference with a property right and a business
expectancy, and asking for the imposition of a constructive trust. The trial court entered sum-
mary judgment for the owner of the property. On appeal, the appellants asserted that the new
owner of the property held the sewer water capacity allocation in constructive trust. The court
stated that, in order for a constructive trust to apply, a confidential or fiduciary relationship
must exist between the parties and that no such relationship existed. Id.
207. 858 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
208. Id. at 507. The court found that the terms of an oral agreement between a landman
and a geologist concerning the development of certain mineral properties supported the impo-
sition of the constructive trust. Id, The landman acquired one lease for himself and one for
his wife following the expiration of the primary term of the lease when it was held for the
benefit of a group of investors under an oral agreement. The geologist and the other investors
petitioned the trial court for a judgment declaring the parties' rights in connection with the
leases and requested the imposition of a constructive trust over the leases. The trial court held
that the landman breached duties to his partner and the other investors and imposed a con-
structive trust over the leases in favor of all of the investors. Id.
209. Id. at 507-08. The trial court entered a judgment reflecting the interests of the inves-
tors under a Joint Operating Agreement, which only became effective upon completion of a
producing well. The court of appeals held that the trial court should have determined the
interests of the parties under the oral partnership agreement, which was in effect prior to
completion of a producing well. Id. at 508.
210. 837 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
211. Id. at 839.
212. The first trial ended in a mistrial and the second trial ended with a hung jury.
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lifetime. The appellant's father deeded his undivided interest in the proper-
ties to his children in 1980. The father told his family members at the time
that he executed the deeds that he intended for the deeds to become opera-
tive at his death. The father retained possession of the property and paid for
all taxes and repairs on the property. Although the deeds recited considera-
tion, everyone, including the appellant, admitted that the donees paid no
consideration for the property. The appeals court noted that the purpose of
a resulting trust is to prevent unjust enrichment due to failure of an express
trust. 2 13 The court looked at the facts surrounding the execution of the
deeds and determined that the appellant's father clearly intended to retain
his interest in the property until his death. 21 4 The court thus found that the
father engrafted a trust upon the deeds by his statements to family
members. 2 15
In Masterson v. Hogue2 16 the court did not find a resulting trust because
the persons alleging the resulting trust failed to present any summary judg-
ment evidence to rebut a presumption of gift.2 17 The decedent acquired
property at times after 1947, apparently with his parents' assistance. Fol-
lowing his death, the decedent's mother, who has since died, and his two
siblings alleged that the decedent held the property in a resulting trust be-
cause his parents assisted in the purchase of the assets. The appeals court
noted that a presumption of gift arises when parents assist a child to
purchase property held in the child's name and that only clear and convinc-
ing evidence will overcome the presumption. 2 18 The family members offered
no summary judgment evidence supporting their allegation of a resulting
trust and, in fact, the trial court deemed that they admitted that the parents
gratuitously assisted their son without expectation of reimbursement. The
appeals court held that the failure of the family members to respond to the
requests for admissions in a timely manner constituted a judicial admission,
so that they were deemed to have admitted that the parents' assistance with
the purchase of various assets were gifts to their son. 2 19
C. STANDBY TRUST
In In re Estate of CanaleS220 the court held that grantors do not have to
execute standby trust agreements with the same formalities with which they
213. 837 S.W.2d at 839.
214. Id. The court found that the testimony of the other children and other family mem-
bers provided clear and convincing evidence that the father intended to retain ownership and
possession of the property. Id.
215. Id. The court also found that the appellant did not have a present possessory interest
in the property since her father orally retained a life estate in his interest in the property and
since he was the life beneficiary of the testamentary trust that owned the remaining undivided
interest in the property. Id. at 840. Because the appellant did not have a present possessory
interest in the land her suit for partition was premature. Id.
216. 842 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
217. Id. at 697.
218. Id. (citing Bogart v. Somer, 762 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1988)).
219. Id.
220. 837 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).
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execute their wills 22 1 and that section 58a of the Probate Code 222 permits
unfunded standby trusts to receive estate assets. 223 The decedent signed his
will and a revocable trust agreement in 1982. The trust agreement estab-
lished a trust for the grantor's life then to trusts for his three children. The
trust agreement also established the three trusts for the benefit of the gran-
tor's children. The trustee of the trusts acknowledged receipt of $1.00 in
cash and the property listed on Schedule A to the trust agreement. Schedule
A never contained a list of property. The grantor died about two months
after he executed his will and the trust agreement. The executor filed a peti-
tion for final accounting, distribution and closing of the estate, resignation of
trustee, and release and discharge of executor and trustee approximately
three years after the decedent's death. Two of the children answered and
filed counterclaims, and the county court transferred the estate to the district
court. The district court found that the will and both sets of trusts under the
trust agreement were valid and that the children had received benefits under
the will and trust, so that they could not contest the dispositive provisions of
the documents. One of the sons appealed. The appeals court first found that
the trust for the grantor's benefit was funded and did not fail. 224 The court
then found that a testator must execute a standby trust before or at the same
time he executes his will. 225 The court next determined that section 58a of
the Probate Code 226 does not specifically state whether a grantor must fund
a trust executed prior to or at the same time as his will, but determined that
funding is not necessary if the trust agreement meets the statute's other re-
quirements. 227 The court concluded that unfunded standby trusts that com-
ply with Probate Code section 58a 228 may receive estate assets. 229
D. PROCEDURAL MATTERS
In Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust 230 the court held that benefi-
ciaries of a trust were not necessary parties to the suit.2 3' The co-trustee
purchased cattle, feed, and related materials and services from a feedlot.
The trust lost several thousand dollars on its investment, as well as the antic-
ipated profits. The trust sued the feedlot for violation of the Texas Deceptive
221. Id. at 665.
222. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58a (Vernon 1980).
223. 837 S.W.2d at 667.
224. Id. at 664.
225. Id. at 665 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58a (Vernon 1980)). This section does
not require that the trust be executed with the same formalities as a will. Further, TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 112.004 (Vernon 1984) does not require witnesses to a grantor's signature on
trust agreements.
226. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58a (Vernon 1980).
227. 837 S.W.2d at 666. The court noted that the legislature could have specifically re-
quired funding if it chose to do so, but it did not. Id.
228. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58a (Vernon 1980).
229. 837 S.W.2d at 667. The court reversed the part of the trial court's order that found
that the will and trust agreement were valid as a matter of law because the executor's motion
did not make that assertion. Id. at 668.
230. 855 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, writ requested).
231. Id. at 833.
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Trade Practices Act 232 for misrepresenting the characteristics and quality of
the goods and services. The trial court entered judgment against the feedlot
and the feedlot appealed. The feedlot first alleged that the trust was not a
consumer as defined by the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.233 The appeals
court held that the trust was a consumer within the meaning of the act.2 34
The court next found that the beneficiaries of the trust were not necessary
parties. 235 Finally, the court held that the co-trustee could properly invest in
cattle. 236
In Wohler v. La Buena Vida In Western Hills, Inc. 237 the court held that a
petition naming as defendant the trustee individually and as trustee was suf-
ficient to bind trust assets. 238 The court further found that service was effec-
tive because the address on the citation listed the trustee individually and as
trustee and because the petition alleged a cause of action against the trustee
both individually and as trustee. 239 Finally, the court held that the benefi-
ciaries of the trust were not necessary parties to the suit because their inter-
ests were not adverse to the interests of the trustee. 240 A homeowners
association sued the trustee individually and in her capacity as trustee to
foreclose its lien on a lot that the trustee owned for the trustee's failure to
pay assessments. The court entered a default judgment against the trustee,
individually and in her fiduciary capacity. A third party purchased the
property at the sheriff's sale and the district court paid the remaining sums,
after payment of the assessment and costs to the homeowners association, to
the trustee as trustee. The trustee negotiated the district clerk's check. The
trustee then appealed, alleging that the petition made no claim against the
trust and that service was defective.
In Werner v. Colwell24 1 the court considered whether the trial court cor-
rectly entered judgment against an employee benefit trust when the trustee
was not named a party to the suit and determined that the trustee, by testify-
ing at the trial in her fiduciary capacity, allowed the court to enter judgment
232. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46(b)(5), (b)(7) (Vernon 1987).
233. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
234. 855 S.W.2d at 832. The court did not agree with the feedlot's contention that the
trust bought the cattle for an investment rather than for use as a consumer. Id.
235. Id. at 833. The court noted that the feedlot did not provide a copy of the trust agree-
ment with the record, so that the court had to presume that the trial court correctly considered
the language of the trust document in determining that the beneficiaries were not necessary
parties. Id. The court found that the beneficiaries did not complain about the co-trustee's
representation and they did not assert that the co-trustee had a conflict of interest with them.
Id.
236. Id. at 834. The court examined TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056(b) (Vernon Supp.
1994), which provides that a trustee may invest in every type of property in which ordinarily
prudent persons would invest. 855 S.W.2d at 833-34. The court found that the trustee could
clearly invest in cattle. Id. at 834.
237. 855 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no writ).
238. Id. at 893.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 857 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993), rev'd, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 208, No. D-4260,
1993 WL 483536 (Nov. 24, 1993) (reversing the judgment against the trustee in her fiduciary




against her in her fiduciary capacity by implied consent. 242 An employee
sued her employer and its sole shareholders for injuries that she suffered on
the job. The employer was not a subscriber to workers' compensation, but
the corporation did have an employee benefit trust. The employee did not
name the trustee of the employee benefit trust in her petition. The trustee of
the plan appeared at trial and testified in her capacity as trustee. The
trustee's attorney objected at trial that she was not named as a party to the
suit in her fiduciary capacity, but the trial court never ruled on the objection.
The appeals court found that the trial court tried the issue of the trustee's
liability by consent since the trustee's attorney did not obtain a ruling about
his objection and since the trustee testified about the benefit plan. 243
E. PRIVITY
In Thompson v. Vinson & Elkins24 4 the court held that no privity existed
between the attorneys for a testamentary trustee and the beneficiaries of the
trust 24 - and that it would not depart from the privity requirement in finding
a breach of contract. 24 6 The decedent left her residuary estate in trust for
the benefit of her husband during his life, then to her niece and nephew. The
decedent's husband and accountant served as initial co-trustees, with the ac-
countant continuing as sole trustee following the husband's death. The ac-
countant engaged Vinson & Elkins to represent him in connection with
distribution of the trust assets. The bulk of the trust estate was stock in a
closely held corporation, which Vinson & Elkins represented, owned in large
part by the husband's family members, whom Vinson & Elkins also repre-
sented. The decedent's niece and nephew felt that the trustee and the corpo-
ration, aided by Vinson & Elkins, attempted to undermine the value of their
interest in the trust through attempting to acquire the stock at its net book
value, as determined by the trustee. The niece and nephew sued the trustee,
the law firm, and others for causes of action arising out of the transaction.
The niece and nephew specifically alleged that the law firm engaged in pro-
fessional negligence, violated a confidential relationship that it had with
them, breached its fiduciary duty to them, converted their property, violated
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act,247 and breached its contract with them.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Vinson & Elkins and the niece
and nephew appealed. On appeal, they contended for the first time that the
law firm engaged in conspiracy with the other defendants against them. The
appeals court found that it could not consider this issue because they did not
present it to the trial court. 24 8 The court also found that the niece and
nephew did not present a cause of action having to do with interference with
their inheritance rights in their pleadings, so it also could not consider this
242. 857 S.W.2d at 78.
243. Id.
244. 859 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ requested).
245. Id. at 621.
246. Id. at 622.
247. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994).
248. 859 S.W.2d at 621.
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issue.249 The court found that the niece and nephew raised the issue of
breach of contract in their pleadings, but they did not submit any evidence of
contract in their response to the law firm's motion for summary judgment,
so the court could not consider this issue on appeal. 2 0 The court found that
no privity existed between the law firm and the niece and nephew to support
their claim for professional negligence. 251 The court also found that the
niece and nephew did not have a negligence cause of action against the law
firm because they were not its clients. 2 2
F. TRUSTEES
In Neuhaus v. Richards253 the court considered the effect of an exculpa-
tory provision in a trust instrument 254 and section 113.003 of the Trust
Code25 5 on allegations of willful misconduct by the trustees.256 The grantors
established several trusts for the benefit of the children and grandchildren in
1976 and funded the trusts with stock in McAllen State Bank. In July 1982
First City Bancorporation bought all of the stock of McAllen State Bank in
a stock exchange. The co-trustees of two of the trusts retained the First City
stock in the trusts despite declining values and the beneficiaries' requests.
The stock in one of the trusts lost almost all of its value and the trustees
249. Id.
250. Id.
25 1. Id. The court noted that for a professional negligence claim privity depends upon the
existence of a contractual relationship between the attorney and client. Id. (citing Dickey v.
Jansen, 731 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.)). The
court found that Vinson & Elkins submitted summary judgment proof that it had no privity
with the niece and nephew. 859 S.W.2d at 621. The niece and nephew also admitted that they
had no privity with the law firm, but asked the court to expand the concept of privity. Id. at
622. The appeals court refused to do so, relying on its reasoning in Dickey, 731 S.W.2d at 583.
252. 859 S.W.2d at 623. The court further found that the law firm owed no fiduciary duty
to the niece and nephew because it represented neither the niece and nephew nor the dece-
dent's estate or trust. Id. The court declined to expand the fiduciary relationship that a law
firm owes to an executor and trustee to extend to the beneficiaries of the estate or trust. Id. at
624. The trial court also correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm on the
niece and nephew's cause of action for violation of a confidential relationship. Id. The niece
and nephew both admitted that they had never consulted the law firm. The court found that
the niece and nephew did not have a valid cause of action against the law firm for conversion
through its advice to a third party, who then allegedly converted their property. Id. Further,
the niece and nephew could not make a claim under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1994), because they were not
consumers within the meaning of TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
In addition the court held that summary judgment denying the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
claims was proper because the summary judgment evidence showed that Vinson & Elkins' acts
were not a producing cause of damages. 859 S.W.2d at 625. Finally, the court rejected the
claim of the niece and nephew that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment be-
cause of outstanding discovery issues. Id. at 626. The court noted that the niece and nephew
had more than a year to conduct their discovery before the law firm filed its motion for sum-
mary judgment and more than fifteen months to do so before the court entered the summary
judgment. Id. The niece and nephew did not present motions to compel to the trial court for a
ruling, according to the record, although they did file the motions, nor did they request a
hearing on the motions or submission dates for the motions.
253. 846 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted).
254. Id. at 75-77.
255. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.003 (Vernon 1984).
256. 846 S.W.2d at 77-79.
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delayed the sale of the stock in the other trust until it had lost significant
value. The beneficiaries of the two trusts sued the co-trustees based upon
alleged mismanagement of the First City stock. 257 The trial court granted
summary judgment against the beneficiaries. The appeals court first ex-
amined the duty of a trustee to manage trust property and the gloss that an
exculpatory clause may put upon the duty. 258 The court then closely ex-
amined the exculpatory provisions of the trust agreement and determined
that the first exculpatory provision in the agreement was ambiguous. 259 The
court interpreted the ambiguous clause to require the trustees to sell the
stock if prudent to do so. 260 The court further found that the exculpatory
provision would have no effect to relieve the trustees' liability for bad faith
actions or actions adverse to the beneficiary. 261 The court determined, based
on its examination of the second exculpatory provision of the trust agree-
ment, that the trustees have liability for willful misconduct or dishonesty. 262
The court next examined section 113.003 of the Trust Code 263 to determine
whether it granted protection to the trustees for failure to sell the First City
stock. 264 The court first determined that the First City stock is a different
asset than the original gift of McAllen State Bank stock. 265 The court nar-
rowly construed section 113.003 of the Trust Code 266 to determine that the
language exculpating a trustee from selling property added to the trust
means only property added by gift, not property that the trustee received in
257. The beneficiaries alleged that the co-trustees breached their fiduciary duty under both
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.003 (Vernon 1984) and the trust agreement through the co-
trustees' failure to sell the First City stock. The beneficiaries alleged that the co-trustees not
only failed to exercise ordinary prudence, but also committed willful misconduct through their
inaction. The beneficiaries also asserted causes of action against the law firm in which one of
the co-trustees was a member for malpractice based on negligent representation of the trust, as
well as against the law firm, another of its members, and a co-trustee for civil conspiracy to
lead to the breach of fiduciary duty. Finally, the beneficiaries asserted a cause of action against
the law firm, the other member of the firm, and a co-trustee for violation of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp.
1994).
258. 846 S.W.2d at 74-75. The court found that the language that the grantor includes in a
trust agreement may override the statutory duty of a trustee under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 113.056(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994), but that courts will narrowly construe exculpatory clauses.
846 S.W.2d at 74-75.
259. 846 S.W.2d at 75. The court felt that the language left an uncertainty whether the
trustees still had the duty to manage the property prudently, although the agreement relieved
the trustees of the obligation to sell assets. Id.
260. Id. at 76.
261. Id. (citing InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1987, no writ)).
262. 846 S.W.2d at 76. The court found that the beneficiaries alleged willful misconduct in
their pleadings, so the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the trustees, who did
not offer evidence to show no willful misconduct. Id. at 77.
263. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.003 (Vernon 1984) provides that a trustee may retain
property that is part of the initial trust corpus or that is added to the trust, without liability for
loss or depreciation in value.
264. 846 S.W.2d at 77-79.
265. Id. at 78. The court reasoned that TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.016(5) (Vernon
1984) suggests that restrictions in a trust agreement against sale of stock does not apply to
stock acquired in a stock exchange, so that the statutory protection for a trustee who does not
sell an initial trust asset does not apply to the First City stock. Id.
266. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.003 (Vernon 1984).
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exchange for other assets or purchased. 267
VII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
A. WILLS
The legislature added new subsections (c) and (d) to section 58 of the
Probate Code to clarify whether the gift of an item of personal property
includes the contents found within the item and whether a devise of real
property includes personal property located on the real property. 26 Unless
the testator specifically states that a legacy of an item of personal property,
such as a cedar chest, includes any contents of the item, the legacy does not
include the contents of the item.269 Additionally, the devise of real property
does not include a gift of personal property located on the real property
unless the testator specifically provides that the devise include the personal
property. 270 The legislature amended section 58a of the Probate Code to
validate devises or bequests to any trust, whether the trust were established
before, on the same date as, or after the testator signed the will.27 1 The
legislature amended section 67 of the Probate Code, which provides for dis-
position of a testator's estate to pretermitted children, to include gifts the
testator made either in his or her will in trust for the benefit of the child or
outside the will with the intent that the gift take effect at the testator's
death. 272
The legislature made three amendments to section 68 of the Probate
Code. 2 7 3 Amended section 68(a) now provides that the descendants of a
deceased devisee must survive the testator by 120 hours in order to take
property devised to the devisee. 274 The legislature further amended section
68(a) to clarify that the class gift provision does not apply to descendants of
267. Id. at 79. The court held that the trial court should not have granted summary judg-
ment based upon an application of TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.003 (Vernon 1984), since it
does not apply to the First City stock. 846 S.W.2d at 79. The court also found that the trial
court improperly granted summary judgment on the causes of action based upon the co-trust-
ees' breach of fiduciary duty through willful misconduct. Id.
268. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 6, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3343 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
269. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
270. Id. The legislature added definitions for "[c]ontents," which refers to "tangible per-
sonal property," and "[t]itled personal property," which is "personal property represented by a
certificate of title .. .or [other] designation that signifies ownership." Id. (codified at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
271. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 7, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3343-44 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58a (Vernon Supp.
1994)). Section 58a previously provided that a devise or bequest to an inter vivos trust was
valid only if the trust was established prior to or concurrently with the execution of the will in
which the devise or bequest was made. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58a (Vernon 1980).
272. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 8, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3344-45 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67 (Vernon Supp.
1994)). Section 67 previously did not include a method for including non-probate transfers of
property to a pretermitted child when the transfers took effect on the testator's death. TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 67 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
273. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 9, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3345 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
274. Id. (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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a class member who died prior to the date the testator executed the will.2 7 5
Amended section 68(e) now provides that the inclusion of language in a will
that indicates that class members must survive the testator in order to be
beneficiaries under the will shall prevent the application of section 68(a). 2 7 6
The legislature added new section 69A to the Probate Code to provide
that no court may prohibit a person from executing a new will or codicil. 277
New section 70A to the Probate Code clarifies whether the gift of securities
in a will includes additional securities the testator subsequently acquired as
the result of the ownership of the securities bequeathed under the will.278
The legislature clarified that a devise of securities does not include cash dis-
tributions, such as cash dividends, that accrued before the date of the testa-
tor's death unless the testator clearly states otherwise in the Will. 279
B. NONTESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS
The legislature amended sections 436(3) and (5) of the Probate Code to
add definitions relating to multiple party accounts. 280 Amended Probate
Code section 439(b) provides that a P.O.D. account will be owned by and
payable to the P.O.D. payee or payees, if the party who died signed a written
agreement establishing the P.O.D. account. 28t The legislature also amended
Probate Code section 439(c) to delete any reference to intent and to provide
that trust accounts will be paid to the persons designated as beneficiaries on
the trustee's death, if the trustee signed a written account agreement. 282 The
legislature created a new type of multiple party account, the "convenience
account, ' 28 3 and created a new uniform account card, which contains all of
275. Id.
276. Id. (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68(e) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
277. Act of April 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 120, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 269, 269
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69A (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legislature
defined "court" to mean a "constitutional county court, district court, or statutory county
court, including a statutory probate court." Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69A(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1994)).
278. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 10, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3345 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 70A (Vernon Supp. 1994)). Securities of
the same company acquired because of an action taken by the company, and securities of
another company acquired because of a merger, reorganization, or other distribution by the
company or a successor to the company, with the exception of any securities the testator ac-
quired through the exercise of a purchase option or reinvestment plan, would be part of the
devise unless the testator specified otherwise. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 70A(a)(l)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
279. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 70A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
280. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 25, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3351 (Vernon). This section amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 436(3) to add brokerage
firms to the definition of "financial institutions" and TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 463(5) to add
convenience accounts to the definition of "multiple-party accounts." Id.
281. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 26, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3351 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(b) (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
282. Id. at 3351-52 (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1994)).
283. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 27, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3352 (Vernon); Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 795, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3157, 3157 (Vernon) provide identical language for adding new TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
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the types of accounts available with a brief explanation of each type of ac-
count, that financial institutions may use. 284
C. HEIRSHIP
The legislature amended section 44 of the Probate Code to provide that
the decedent or the recipient of an inter vivos gift or nontestamentary trans-
fer designate in writing that the gift or transfer is an advancement of the
recipient's intestate share of the decedent's estate in order for the gift or
transfer to be considered in the intestate distribution of the estate. 28 5 If the
recipient does not survive the decedent, the distribution of the intestate es-
tate would not include the inter vivos gift.286 The legislature amended sec-
tion 45 of the Probate Code to provide that community property of a
deceased spouse will pass to the surviving spouse if the deceased spouse has
no surviving children or other descendants, or if all of the deceased spouse's
surviving children or other descendants are also children or other descend-
ants of the surviving spouse.28 7
D. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
The legislature significantly amended section 37A of the Probate Code,
which provides for disclaimers of property. 288 The first revision provides
that a disclaimer relates back to the death of the decedent for all purposes
§ 438A. Section 438A allows customers of financial institutions to create accounts in the name
of the actual owner of the account and a cosigner for the convenience of the account owner.
Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 27, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340, 3352
(Vernon) and Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 795, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3157, 3157 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 438A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
The cosigner does not have any ownership interest in the account or any right of survivorship
in account funds on the death of the owner. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846,
§ 27, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340, 3352 (Vernon); Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch.
795, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3157, 3157 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 438A(b)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
284. Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 795, § 2, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3157,
3157-59 (Vernon), added new TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A, which provides a uniform
form for single-party or multiple-party accounts, with brief explanations of each type of ac-
count. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). Financial
institutions received protection from claims of inadequate disclosure of the information of each
type of account if they use the form provided in TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A(b) or a
variation of the suggested form that discloses the information provided in TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 439A. Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 795, § 2, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3157, 3159 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439A(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
285. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 4, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3342-43 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 44 (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
286. Id.
287. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 33, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3354 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). If
the deceased spouse has any surviving children or other descendants who are not also children
or other descendants of the surviving spouse, the decedent's community property interests will
pass to his children or other descendants. Id. (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 45(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
288. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,




and disclaimed property is not subject to any creditor of the disclaimant. 289
The second revision provides for the acceleration of future interests to the
effective date of the disclaimer. 290 Third, the legislature amended section
37A(b) of the Probate Code to provide the same deadline for notice of the
disclaimer to the legal representative of the transferor as for filing the dis-
claimer under section 37A(a) of the Probate Code. 291 Finally, the legislature
added new section 37A(f) to enable a surviving spouse to make a qualified
disclaimer under section 2518 of the Internal Revenue Code 292 for property
passing from the deceased spouse without affecting other transfers, including
residuary transfers of the disclaimed property, to or for the benefit of the
surviving spouse. 293
The legislature amended section 47(d) 6f the Probate Code to provide that
the 120-hour survivorship rule will apply to real property as well as to per-
sonal property and to community property with rights of survivorship. 294
The legislature created new section 89A, which provides for probate of a will
as a muniment of title.295 The legislature amended section 145(q) 296 and
added section 154A(i) 297 of the Probate Code to protect judges from per-
sonal liability for the appointment of independent executors and independent
289. Id. The legislature amended TEX. PROP. CODE § 112.010(d) to provide that a dis-
claimer of property held in trust relates back to the date of the transfer of the property for all
purposes and the disclaimed property is not subject to the creditors of the disclaimant. Act of
May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 3, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340, 3342 (Vernon).
The legislature also amended TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 24.002(12) to provide that the term
"transfer" does not include a disclaimer filed under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A or TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.010. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 2, 1993 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. 3340, 3342 (Vernon).
290. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3341 (Vernon). The legislature also amended the corresponding section in the Property Code.
Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 3, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340, 3342
(Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.010(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
291. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3341 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A(b) (Vernon Supp.
1994)); see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
292. I.R.C. § 2518 (1986); see Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(2) (1986).
293. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3342 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A(f) (Vernon Supp. 1994)) (redesig-
nating subsequent subsections).
294. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 5, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3343 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
295. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, §§ 11-12, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3340, 3345-47 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89A (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
Section 11 of the act deletes all references to probate of a will as a muniment of title from TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 89. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 11, 1993 Tex. Sess
Law Serv. 3340, 3346-47 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89
(Vernon Supp. 1994)). Section 12 of the act creates new TEX. PROB. CODE § 89A, which
contains all provisions for probate as a muniment of title. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S.,
ch. 846, § 12, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340, 3347 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 89A (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legislature also created a procedure through which
the court may include a declaratory judgment construing the will or determining the persons
who shall receive property under the will, as well as each beneficiary's respective share or
interest in the estate. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 89A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
296. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 15, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3348 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145(q) (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
297. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 16, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
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administrators or from the acts or omissions of independent executors and
independent administrators.
The legislature has now provided a method through which a surviving
spouse may collect a decedent's final paycheck by affidavit when no adminis-
tration is pending in the deceased spouse's estate. 29 8 The legislature has pro-
vided a method of allowing the surviving spouse or anyone who may act on
behalf of the decedent's minor children to have exempt property set aside
prior to the filing of the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims of the
decedent's estate299 and to have the court fix the amount of the family allow-
ance prior to the filing of the inventory, appraisement, and list of claims of
the decedent's estate.30 0 The legislature has also increased the allowance in
lieu of a homestead from $10,000 to $15,000 and the allowance in lieu of
other exempt property from $1,000 to $5,000.301
The legislature added new section 378B to the Probate Code to provide
for allocation of income and expenses during the administration of the dece-
dent's estate.30 2 Unless the testator's will provides otherwise, the principal
of the estate will bear estate administration expenses, debts, funeral ex-
penses, estate taxes, and other related expenses, but the personal representa-
tive may allocate fees and expenses of attorneys, accountants, and other
professional advisors, court costs, and other similar expenses between in-
come and principal. 30 3 The personal representative will determine income
earned during the estate administration in the same method as a Trustee
under the Trust Code30 4 and distribute the income in the manner set forth in
new section 378B. 30 5 The legislature provided for distribution of income to
the beneficiaries of the estate, based on the type of devise or bequest in sec-
tions 378B(c)-(g). 30 6
The legislature amended section 233 of the Probate Code to provide that a
3348 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 154A(i) (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
298. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 17, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3348 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 160(b)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
person or entity who delivers the paycheck to the spouse in reliance on the affidavit has no
liability for the delivery of the funds to the surviving spouse. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 160(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The ability of the surviving spouse to collect the final
paycheck does not affect the disposition of the funds represented by the paycheck. Id. (codi-
fied at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 160(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
299. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 18, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3348-49 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 271 (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
300. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 20, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3349 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 286 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
301. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 19, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3349 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 273 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
302. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 24, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3350-51 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378B (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
303. Id.; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378B(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
304. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 113.101-.1ll (Vernon 1984).
305. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 24, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3350-51 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 378B(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
306. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 24, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3350-51 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 378B(c)-(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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personal representative may enter into a contingent fee contract for up to
one-third of the damages or settlement amount, subject to court approval. 30 7
Further, the personal representative may seek court approval to enter a con-
tingent fee contract for payment in excess of one-third of the damages or
settlement amount prior to the time that the personal representative enters
the contingent fee contract. 30 8 The legislature amended section 406 of the
Probate Code to provide that a court may close an estate administration
without a final accounting if no interested party has filed a complaint with
the court and if the court does not know the whereabouts of the personal
representative or heirs. 30 9 The legislature amended section 333 of the Pro-
bate Code to give courts guidance in determining whether to order the sale
of assets of estates that will likely lose value or that will be expensive or
disadvantageous for the personal representative to maintain in the estate. 31 0
The legislature amended section 137 of the Probate Code to provide that
title to a homestead may be transferred by a small estate affidavit if the
homestead is the only real property owned by the decedent's estate. 31' New
section 129A of the Probate Code provides that if attempts to make service
under Part 4 of the Probate Code are unsuccessful, service may be made
under Rule 109 or Rule 109a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure31 2 by
publication or substituted service. 313 Annual accounts and final accounts
must now contain statements that the personal representative has filed all tax
returns due during the accounting period and has paid all taxes due, as well
307. Act of May 20, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 848, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3358,
3358-59 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 233(b) (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
308. Id. at 3358 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 233(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). If the
personal representative does not receive court approval prior to entering the contract, the con-
tract is void. Id. The legislature also provided courts with guidance in determining whether
the contract, entered under either § 233(b) or § 233(c), is reasonable and should be approved.
Act of May 20, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 848, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3358, 3358-59
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 233(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
309. Act of May 25, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 898, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3561,
3561-62 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 406(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
court may order the close of the estate at any time after four years from the last date that the
clerk issues letters testamentary or letters of administration. Id. The legislature also amended
§ 406(a) of the Probate Code to provide that the court has discretion to order the personal
representative to appear and present the final account unless an interested party complains. If
the court receives a complaint from an interested party, it must order the personal representa-
tive to appear and present the final account. Act of May 25, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 898, § 1,
1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3561, 3561 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 406(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
310. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 21, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3349 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 333 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
311. Act of May 27, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 594, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2253,
2253-54 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 137(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
heirs must record the affidavit in the deed records of the county in which the real estate is
located. Id. at 2253. The heirs may sell the property and the purchaser may rely on the
recorded affidavit, although the purchaser will be subject to claims of the decedent's creditors.
Id. Any heirs not included in the recorded affidavit may recover from those heirs that received
consideration for the sale of the homestead. Id.
312. TEX. R. Civ. P. 109, 109a.
313. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 2, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2792 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 129A (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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as the date of payment and the entity to which the personal representative
paid the taxes.314 If the personal representative filed any tax returns or paid
any taxes after the due date, the personal representative must include a de-
scription of and the reasons for the delinquency on both annual accounts
and the final account.315 The legislature added a new chapter to the Probate
Code entitled "Informal Probate. ' 316 The applicant may file a will for infor-
mal probate at least thirty days after the decedent's death, but within four
years of the date of the decedent's death.31 7 The executor or successor exec-
utor named in the will, or a devisee or legatee named in the will, are persons
who may apply for informal probate. 318 The proper venue for the applica-
tion is the county of the testator's domicile at the time of death or in the
county in which estate assets are located. 31 9 An informal probate is proper
if the estate has no known debts, or if all debts are properly secured or the
creditor has notified all of the estate's creditors by certified or registered mail
of the filing of the application, if the applicant files an affidavit provided by a
disinterested witness of the facts necessary to probate a will under sections
88(a) and 88(b) of the Probate Code, 3 2 0 and if no one has filed an application
for probate under any other sections of the Probate Code.32'
Section 504 sets forth the contents of the application for informal pro-
bate.3 22 The applicant must furnish notice of the intent to file the will for
314. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 4, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2792-93 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 399(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1994)) (pro-
viding for the inclusion of the statement on annual accounts); Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 712, § 6, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790, 2793-94 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 405(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1994)) (providing for the inclusion of the statement on
the final account).
315. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 4, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2792-93 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 399(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1994)) (pro-
viding for inclusion of this information on annual accounts); Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 712, § 6, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790, 2793-94 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 405(a)(9) (Vernon Supp. 1994)) (providing for inclusion of this information on
the final account).
316. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 7, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2794-98 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 501-510, 520-524 (Vernon Supp.
1994)). The legislature also assigned section numbers 501-506 to the new chapter on the Dura-
ble Power of Attorney. Act of April 15, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 49, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 103, 103-13 (Vernon). For discussion of the Durable Power of Attorney Act, see infra
notes 422-34 and accompanying text.
317. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 7, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2794-95 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 501 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
318. Id. at 2795 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 502(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
319. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 502(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
320. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88(a)-(b) (Vernon 1980).
321. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 7, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2795 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 503 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
322. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 504 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The application
must be made under oath and must contain the following statements: that at least thirty days
have passed since the date of the testator's death; that the estate has no debts or that all debts
are secured or the applicant has notified the creditors; that the total gross fair market value of
the estate, excluding the homestead and other exempt property, does not exceed $50,000; that
venue is proper; that, to the applicant's knowledge, the testator never revoked the will; and
that, to the applicant's knowledge, no one named in the will objects to filing the will for infor-
mal probate. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 504(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). Addi-
tionally, the application must include the applicant's social security number and address, and
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informal probate and a copy of the will by either registered or certified mail
to every person named in the will, as well as to the testator's spouse and
children.3 23 In addition to the will and the affidavit of a disinterested per-
son, the applicant must file a sworn inventory of all of the testator's assets,
along with fair market values of the assets, with the application. 324 The
court may issue limited letters testamentary to the applicant for the purpose
of transferring title to the testator's assets, but the limited letters must list
the specific assets or a certified copy of the inventory must be attached to the
letters. 325 Section 508 sets forth the determinations the court must make in
order to admit the will to informal probate, as well as the determinations
that preclude informal probate. 326 Section 509 details the effect of informal
probate on title to the estate's assets.327 Section 510 contains the statute of
limitations for contesting a will admitted to informal probate.32 8
the testator's social security number and last address. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 504(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
323. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 505(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). This section
contains methods for providing notice to minors or incompetents, id. (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 505(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)), as well as for waiver of notice. Id. at 2796 (codi-
fied at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 505(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The applicant must file either
original returned notices or the return receipts with the application. Id. at 2795 (codified at
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 505(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
324. Id. at 2796 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 506 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
inventory must contain all information required by TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 250-251
(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1994) and must identify any community assets. Id. (codified at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 506(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The court clerk will submit the will to the
court more than ten days after the applicant files the application and the court may determine
whether to admit the will for informal probate. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 506(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). If the court does not admit a will to informal probate any
interested person may submit an application for formal probate. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 506(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
325. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 507 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The limited
letters testamentary expire one year after the date the court admits the will for informal pro-
bate. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 507(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
326. Id. at 2796-97 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 508 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). Sec-
tion 508 also considers self-proved wills and wills admitted to probate in other states. Id. at
2797 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 508(c)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
327. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 509 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). Persons who
transfer property or make payment under the terms of an informally probated will benefit from
the same release of liability as if they had transferred property or made payment to a personal
representative. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 509(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). Per-
sons who acquire property under the terms of the will may be liable to persons or creditors
with a superior claim to the property, but only to the extent of the value of the property
acquired. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 509(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). A person
may file a show cause action in the court that admitted the will to informal probate if the
person made a written demand, sent by registered or certified mail, for property to which that
person is entitled under the terms of the will, and the person holding the property refuses or
fails to deliver the property within thirty days of the demand. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 509(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
328. Id. (codified at TEX. PRO. CODE ANN. § 510 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The statute of
limitations for contesting the validity of a will admitted to informal probate is two years, id.
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 510(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)), except for a contest for
forgery or fraud, which is two years after the discovery of the forgery or fraud, id. (codified at
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 510(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)), or for a person who is a minor or
incompetent at the time the will is admitted to informal probate, which is two years after the
date the minor or incompetent's disabilities are removed. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 510(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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Part 2 of the new Informal Probate chapter allows emergency intervention
to provide for funeral or burial expenses or for the protection of the dece-
dent's personal property stored in rented accommodations. 329 An applicant
may file an application with the clerk of the court of the county of the dece-
dent's domicile for emergency intervention between the thirtieth day and the
ninetieth day following the decedent's death.330 Any person qualified to
serve as an administrator of the decedent's estate may apply for emergency
intervention. 331 Section 522 lists the contents of the application for emer-
gency intervention, which must include facts showing the necessity for the
court to issue an emergency intervention order. 332 The court may order an
employer, financial institution, or individual that possesses any of the dece-
dent's funds to pay any of those funds to the funeral home for funeral and
burial expenses, but not to exceed $5000.3 3 3 An applicant's authority under
an emergency intervention order terminates on the earlier of the ninetieth
day following the date the court issued the order or the qualification of the
personal representative of the decedent's estate. 334
E. GUARDIANSHIPS
The legislature created a new chapter to the Probate Code to consolidate
the guardianship provisions formerly found throughout the Probate Code, as
well as to add new guardianship provisions.335 New section 601 contains
definitions relating to guardianships. 336 Section 602 sets forth the policy be-
hind and the purpose of guardianships, defines the two types of guardian-
ships as limited guardianships and full guardianships, and specifies that the
court shall design the type guardianship for the individual ward that will
best allow the ward to develop or maintain independence and maximum self-
329. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 7, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2798 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 520-524 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
330. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 520 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The purpose of
the application is to request the court to provide for payment of funeral or burial expenses or
for the protection and storage of the decedent's personal property that is located in rented
accommodations. Id.
331. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 521 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). For a list of
persons qualified to serve as administrator, see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 77 (Vernon 1980).
332. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 522(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). If the appli-
cant makes the application in order to provide for the funeral or burial of the decedent, the
applicant must attach to the application any written instructions the decedent left concerning
his funeral or burial. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 522(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
If the decedent left no written instructions, the applicant must provide the funeral and burial
of the decedent unless the court permits the applicant to cremate the decedent's body. Id.
333. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 523(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The clerk
may only issue certified copies of the emergency intervention order until the earlier of ninety
days after the date after the court issued the order or the qualification of a personal representa-
tive of the decedent's estate. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 523(b) (Vernon Supp.
1994)). Any person who acts in accordance with and reliance on a certified copy of the emer-
gency intervention order is not liable for those acts. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 523(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
334. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 524 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
335. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4084-4161 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 601-892 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
336. Id. at 4084-86 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 601 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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reliance. 337 Section 603 provides that provisions of the Probate Code that
apply to decedents' estates also apply to guardianship estates unless in con-
flict with specific guardianship provisions and that any references to an "in-
competent person," a "person of unsound mind," or a "habitual drunkard"
means an "incapacitated person. ' 338
The jurisdiction of county courts over guardianship estates remains un-
changed, 339 while the legislature expanded the probate court's jurisdiction to
include continuing jurisdiction, following the ward's death, over cases initi-
ated during the ward's life between successor guardians and former guardi-
ans.3 ° The probate court may now transfer a contested guardianship of the
person of a minor to another court of competent jurisdiction in which a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship is pending.34 ' The venue provi-
sions 342 and the provisions relating to the duties and records of the clerk 343
have not changed from prior law. The provisions relating to the issuance,
contents, and service and return of citations remain largely unchanged from
prior law, although the legislature clarified the provisions relating to the ser-
vice of notice.344
The legislature made several amendments to the sections of the Probate
Code dealing with the trial. 345 Section 642 provides that any person may
begin or contest guardianship proceedings except persons who have an inter-
est adverse to the proposed ward. 346 A court may now consider motions and
applications filed on routine matters in existing guardianships without a for-
mal hearing.347 The provisions concerning the appointment of a guardian ad
litem are basically the same, except for the clarification that the court may
appoint the guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of the "incapaci-
tated person."' 348 The court must appoint an attorney ad litem to represent
the proposed ward, as well as an interpreter, if necessary. 349 The legislature
337. Id. at 4086 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 602 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
338. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 603 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
339. Id. at 4086-87 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 605 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
340. Id. at 4087 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 606 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
341. Id. at 4088 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 609 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
probate court will retain jurisdiction over the guardianship of the estate. Id.
342. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4088-90 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 610-618 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
343. Id. at 4090-92 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 621-631 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
344. Id. at 4092-95 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 632-636 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
Section 633 added a requirement that conservators or anyone else who has care and control of
a minor must receive citation. Id. at 4094-95 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 633(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legislature changed the notice provisions to provide that either the
county clerk or the applicant may give notice by certified mail. Id. at 4095 (codified at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 633(e) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The proposed ward's spouse, parents, sib-
lings, and children, as well as the administrator or operator of the nursing home or residential
facility in which the proposed ward resides, and any person that the applicant knows to hold a
power of attorney given by the proposed ward, must receive notice of the guardianship applica-
tion. Id. at 4095 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 633(e)(l)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
345. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4095-98 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 641-651 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
346. Id. at 4096 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 642 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
347. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 644 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
348. Id. at 4096-97 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 645 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
349. Id. at 4097 (codified at TEX. PROH. CODE ANN. § 646 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
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listed the duties of the attorney ad litem in section 647.350 Each statutory
probate court must now operate a court visitor program to assess the condi-
tions of wards and proposed wards. 35'
Letters of guardianship will now expire sixteen months after issuance un-
less the guardian has filed and the court has approved the annual accounting
in a guardianship of the estate or the guardian's annual report in a guardian-
ship of the person. 352 The clerk may reissue the letters if the court has ap-
proved the accounting or the report. 353 The court may now authorize up to
five percent of the ward's income as compensation to the guardian of the
person. 35 4 The court may charge the cost of the guardian ad litem and court
visitor against the ward's estate or against the county, if the ward is indi-
gent.35 5 The court shall review each guardianship annually to determine
whether to continue, modify, or terminate the guardianship. 35 6
A guardian has no personal liability to third parties merely through his
attorney ad litem shall have access to copies of all relevant records in the case, including
medical, psychological, and intellectual tests. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 646(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1994)). An attorney, in order to qualify to serve as an attorney ad litem, must
complete a guardianship law and procedure course and the State Bar must certify the attorney,
id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 646(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)), unless the attorney
served as an attorney ad litem in a guardianship proceeding prior to September 1, 1993. Id.
(codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 646(e) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
350. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 647 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The attorney ad
litem, prior to the hearing, must interview and discuss with the proposed ward the law and
facts of the case, the proposed ward's legal options, and the grounds on which the applicant
seeks the guardianship. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 647(a) (Vernon Supp.
1994)). The attorney ad litem must also review the application for guardianship, the current
medical records, and all relevant medical, psychological, and intellectual tests prior to the
hearing. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 647(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
351. Id. at 4097-98 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 648 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
court, either on its own motion or upon the request of an interested party, may appoint a court
visitor to evaluate the proposed ward or ward in a written report at any time prior to the
appointment of a guardian or during a guardianship. Id. at 4097 (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 648(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The report must include the following informa-
tion: a description of the proposed ward's degree of capacity and incapacity, including the
medical history, if available and if the court does not waive the requirement for the medical
history; a list of treating physicians and the medical prognosis, if appropriate; a description of
the ward or proposed ward's living conditions; a description of the ward or proposed ward's
social, intellectual, physical, and educational condition; a statement that the court visitor has
personally visited or observed the proposed ward; a statement of the date of the guardian's
most recent visit to the ward, if the court has appointed a guardian; a recommendation for any
changes needed in the guardianship or proposed guardianship, including removal of an ex-
isting guardian or denial of a guardianship; and any other information the court requires. Id.
at 4097-98 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 648(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
352. Id. at 4099 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 659 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 4100 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 665 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
355. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 669 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
356. Id. at 4101 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 672 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). Statu-
tory probate courts shall review a report prepared by a court investigator pursuant to TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0025 (Vernon Supp. 1994), review a report prepared by a court visi-
tor, or conduct a hearing. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 672(b) (Vernon Supp.
1994)). A court other than a statutory probate court may make its annual determination as
appropriate, considering the court's caseload and resources. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 672(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The court must file its written determination concerning




status as guardian.3 57 The ward will retain all civil and legal rights and
powers except those rights and powers the court designated as legal disabili-
ties by specifically granting the powers and rights to the guardian. 35 8 Courts
must now appoint a guardian for a person other than a minor after consider-
ing the circumstances and best interests of the ward. 359 The court must ap-
ply a best interest test prior to approving a minor's selection of guardian. 36°
A court may now appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests of
the proposed ward through litigation of the ward's claim if the ward's parent
or another close relative could not otherwise qualify as guardian because of
the proposed guardian's own interest in the claim. 36 1
The legislature merged all application provisions formerly required for
permanent and limited guardianships into section 682.362 A court shall ap-
point an attorney ad litem or a court investigator to investigate and file an
application for guardianship, if necessary, if probable cause exists that some-
one who does not have a guardian is incapacitated. 36 3 Courts must now find
by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed ward is incapacitated
and all other allegations contained in the application for guardianship. 364
Proposed wards must personally appear at the hearing on the application for
guardianship unless the court finds, on the record, that the personal appear-
ance is not necessary. 365 The attorney ad litem must receive the relevant
medical records and results of tests prior to the appointment of the guardian
unless the proposed ward is a minor, missing person, or person who must
have a guardian in order to receive government funds, or the court finds on
the record that no current or relevant records exist.3 66 The court may not
grant a guardianship for anyone other than a minor or mentally retarded
person without a letter, filed in the proceeding, from a licensed physician
dated not earlier than 120 days prior to the date of the hearing that states
357. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 673 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
358. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 675 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
359. Id. at 4102 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 677 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
360. Id. at 4104 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 680 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
legislature considered this change to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 118 earlier in the session. Act
of April 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 135, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 283, 283-84 (Vernon).
361. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4104 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 681 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legisla-
ture passed changes to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 110 earlier in the session, which were sub-
stantially the same as the changes incorporated in the major guardianship legislation. Act of
May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 13, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340, 3347 (Vernon). If
a nonresident guardian fails to name a resident agent for service of process, the guardian shall
now be disqualified. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 4084, 4104 (Vernon) (codified at TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 681(10) (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
362. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4104-05 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 682 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
363. Id. at 4105 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 683 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
364. Id. at 4105-06 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 684 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
365. Id. at 4106 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 685 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
court must inquire into the proposed ward's ability to feed, clothe, and shelter himself and to
manage property or his financial affairs. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 685(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1994)).
366. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 686 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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that, in the physician's opinion, the proposed ward is incapacitated and de-
scribes the extent of the incapacity. 367 The court must consider the prefer-
ence of the incapacitated person concerning the appointment of the
guardian. 368
The legislature has freed the courts to grant custom guardianships, based
upon the incapacitated person's ability. 369 If the court finds that the pro-
posed ward has the ability to care for himself and manage his property, the
court must dismiss the application for guardianship. 370 Upon the court's
determination that the proposed ward has no ability to care for himself or to
manage his property, the court shall include its determination as a finding of
fact and appoint a guardian of the person, the estate, or both, with full au-
thority. 37' If the court finds that the proposed ward has the ability to per-
form some, but not all, of the tasks necessary to provide for his own care or
to manage his property, the court may appoint a guardian with powers lim-
ited to those tasks that the proposed ward cannot do for himself.372 The
order appointing the guardian must include the court's findings of fact and
set forth the specific powers, limitations, or duties of the guardian.
373
Courts may now appoint private professional guardians if properly certi-
fied. 374 A private professional guardian must apply annually to the clerk for
certification, provide the clerk with the information set forth in section
697(a), 375 and pay an application fee. 3 7 6 The county clerk must obtain a
criminal history record from the Texas Department of Public Safety or the
FBI for any private professional guardian or any person who represents the
ward's interests as guardian on behalf of a private professional guardian.
377
All guardians shall file annual accounts within sixty days of the due date,
367. Id. at 4106-07 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 687 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
court may, in its discretion, order an independent medical evaluation of the proposed ward.
Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 687(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). If the proposed ward
is a mentally retarded person, a physician or psychologist licensed by the State or certified by
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation shall examine the proposed
ward unless the proposed ward has been examined within six months prior to the date of the
hearing. Id. at 4107 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 687(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
368. Id. at 4107 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 689 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
369. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4108 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 693 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
370. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 693(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
371. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 693(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
372. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 693(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
373. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 693(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
374. Id. at 4109 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 696 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
375. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 697(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
376. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 697(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
377. Id. at 4109-10 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 698 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
county clerk may not release or disclose the criminal history record to anyone except on court
order or with consent of the person who is the subject of the investigation. Id. (codified at
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 698(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The court has exclusive use of the
criminal history record, which is privileged and confidential. Id. The court may use the infor-
mation only for the purpose of determining whether to appoint, remove, or continue the ap-
pointment of a private professional guardian. Id. at 4110 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 698(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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unless the court extends the time for filing the account. 378 The guardian
shall attach an affidavit to the annual account stating that the account con-
tains an accurate accounting, that the guardian has paid the bond premium
for the next accounting period, that the guardian has filed all tax returns due
during the accounting period, and that the guardian has paid all taxes the
ward owed during the accounting period, including the amount of taxes, the
date the guardian paid the taxes, and the name of the entity to which the
guardian paid the taxes. 379 If the guardian failed to file a tax return or pay
taxes due during the accounting period, the guardian must include a descrip-
tion of the taxes and the reasons for the failure to file the return or pay the
taxes.38 0 The court now has discretion to remove a guardianship estate from
the court's active docket without a final accounting and appointing a succes-
sor guardian, three years after a minor reaches the age of majority or the
death of a deceased ward if no one has filed a complaint concerning the
estate with the court. 381 Money held under safekeeping arrangements may
not be distributed to the guardian without a court order, at any time prior to
approval of the final account. 38 2
A court may now appoint a spouse, parent, or child as successor guardian
if the spouse, parent, or child previously could not serve because of a litiga-
tion conflict, upon the removal of the conflict. 383 A guardian of the person
must file with the written application to resign as guardian, a report stating
the condition of the ward. 384 The court may remove a guardian without
notice if the court has clear and convincing evidence provided under oath
that the guardian has misapplied, embezzled, or removed from Texas, or is
about to misapply, embezzle, or remove from Texas, all or any part of the
guardianship estate or that the guardian has cruelly treated the ward or ne-
glected to educate or maintain the ward. 385 The court may reinstate the
guardian removed under an ex parte order if the court determines that the
removal was inappropriate. 386
The guardian of an adult may expend guardianship funds under court
378. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4118 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 741(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
379. Id. at 4419 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 741(e) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
380. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 741(0 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legisla-
ture amended TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 405(b) earlier in the session to include substantially
the same provisions relating to information concerning the filing of tax returns and payments
of taxes during the accounting period. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 6, 1993
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790, 2793-94 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 405
(Vernon Supp. 1994)).
381. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4122-23 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 750(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). A
court may also remove a guardianship estate from its docket without a final accounting for a
ward whose whereabouts are unknown for four or more years after the court lost contact with
the ward, if no one has complained. Id. at 4123 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 750(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1994)).
382. Id. at 4123-24 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 753 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
383. Id. at 4125 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 759(h) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
384. Id. at 4125-26 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 760 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
385. Id. at 4126 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 761(6)-(7) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
386. Id. at 4127 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 762 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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order to provide care for the incapacitated person. 38 7 A guardian, except for
the guardian of a minor under age 16,388 or the guardian of a person who
require emergency or respite care, 389 may not admit the ward to an in-pa-
tient psychiatric facility or to a residential facility operated by the Texas
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation without first apply-
ing for admission under the Health and Safety Code,3 90 or applying to the
court.3 9 1
A guardian of the estate may now enter contingency fee agreements for
one-third of the recovery, plus expenses, and the court may approve contin-
gent fee agreements in excess of one-third of the recovery under certain con-
ditions. 392 A guardian may now expend more than $5000 during an
accounting period without prior court approval, if the expenditure is made
to a nursing home in which the ward resides and if the court ratifies the
expenditure.3 93 A parent who is the guardian of the person of a minor ward
may not use either income or principal of the guardianship estate for the
ward's support, education, or maintenance unless the court orders the ex-
penditure based upon clear and convincing evidence that the ward's parents
are unable to provide adequately for the ward's support.394 A guardian may
now expend up to $12,000 per year from government funds paid to the
ward's estate without court approval, if the expenditures are for the support,
maintenance, or education of the ward or the ward's dependents. 39 5 A
guardian may now retain assets included in the estate at the creation of the
guardianship if the guardian's decision to retain the assets is reasonably
prudent.3 96
387. Id. at 4128 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 770 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). If the
ward has decision-making ability and agrees to live in a public or private residential facility,
the guardian may apply for residential care and services on behalf of the ward. Id. (codified at
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 770(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The guardian must report the ward's
condition to the court at least annually. Id. If the ward resides in a residential care facility the
guardian's report on the ward's condition must contain a statement concerning the necessity
for continued care in the facility. Id.
388. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 770(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
389. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 770(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
390. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 593.027-593.028 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
391. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4128 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 770(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
guardian must apply to the court for admission of the ward to a facility under TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. Subtitle D, Title 7, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. Subtitle C,
Title 7, or TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ch. 462.
392. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4129 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 772(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legis-
lature provided courts with guidelines to follow in considering whether to allow the guardian
to enter a contingent fee agreement in excess of one-third of the recovery. Id. (codified at TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 772(d) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
393. Id. at 4130 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 776 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
394. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 777 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legislature
added TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 236A, which contains basically the same language as TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 777, earlier in the session. Act of May 20, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 848,
§ 3, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3358, 3359 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 236A (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
395. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4131-32 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 782 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
396. Id. at 4136-37 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 812 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
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Courts may now create a management trust for the benefit of the ward
upon application by the guardian and upon the court's finding that the crea-
tion of the trust is in the ward's best interest. 397 The management trust must
contain the following terms: the sole beneficiary of the trust is the ward; the
trustee may distribute income or principal for the ward's health, support,
maintenance, or education; the trustee must add to principal any net income
not distributed for the ward's benefit; the trustee does not have to post bond;
and the trustee may receive reasonable compensation for services upon court
approval. 398 If the ward is a minor the trust must terminate on the earlier of
the death of the ward or the ward's eighteenth birthday, unless the court
orders the termination of the trust at a later date, which may not extend past
the date the ward attains age 25. 399 If the ward is an incapacitated adult the
trust must terminate on the earlier of the date that the court determines that
the guardianship is no longer necessary or on the death of the ward. ° ° The
trustee must submit an annual account to the court in the same manner as
would the guardian of the estate, as well as provide a copy of the annual
account to the guardian of the ward's estate or person.4° 1 Upon termination
of the trust the trustee must distribute the assets of the trust, including any
undistributed income, to the ward or to the representative of a deceased
ward's estate. 4° 2
The legislature added new provisions relating to temporary guardian-
ships,40 3 guardianships for nonresidents, 4° 4 receiverships for minors and
other incapacitated persons,40 5 payment of claims without creation of a
guardianship, 4° 6 sale of property of a minor,4° 7 and nonresident guardi-
ans.408 The legislature amended section 127A of the Probate Code to allow
any person to file an application for temporary guardianship of the estate of
any missing person whom the police or other law enforcement agency be-
legislature considered and passed substantially the same change to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 389 earlier in the session. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 22, 1993 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 3340, 3349-50 (Vernon).
397. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4153 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 867 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). A manage-
ment trust created under this provision will be similar to management trusts created under
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 142.001-.007 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1994). The court shall order
the guardian to deliver all or part of the guardianship estate to the trustee, which shall be a
trust company or state or national bank that has trust powers. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084, 4153 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 867 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The court's order must state the terms and condi-
tions of the trust. Id.
398. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4153 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 868(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
399. Id. at 4154 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 870(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
400. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 870(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
401. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 871 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
402. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 873 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
403. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4154-56 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 875-879 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
404. Id. at 4156-57 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 881-882 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
405. Id. at 4157-58 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 885 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
406. Id. at 4158-60 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 887 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
407. Id. at 4160-61 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 889 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
408. Id. at 4161 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 891-892 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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lieve to be the victim of violence. 40 9 If the court finds that no administration
of the community estate is in the best interest of an incompetent spouse and
that the competent spouse is not disqualified to serve as guardian, the court
will not order a guardianship.4 10
F. TRUSTS
The legislature made several amendments to the Trust Code41' relating to
environmental laws.4 12 The legislature first added the definition of environ-
mental law to the Property Code.4 13 A trustee or a potential trustee may
now inspect trust property in order to determine the potential application of
any environmental law to the property.4 14 A trustee may take any action on
the property that the trustee reasonably believes will correct any potential or
actual violation of an environmental law.41 5 A trustee shall have no liability
to beneficiaries for acting or failing to act or for a loss in value of the prop-
erty in connection with inspecting property or attempting to remedy any
potential or actual violation of environmental laws unless the trustee acts in
bad faith or with gross negligence. 4 16 A trustee may reimburse himself or
pay for expenses incurred in connection with the inspection of the property
or attempting to remedy potential or actual violations of environmental laws
directly from trust assets, whether income or principal or both.4 17
409. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790,
2790-92 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 127A (Vernon Supp.
1994)). The applicant must not be a suspect in the disappearance of the missing person. Id. at
2791 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 127A(g)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The temporary
guardian must post bond and shall have the same authority to manage the financial affairs of
the missing person under court supervision as would any other temporary guardian. Id. at
2792 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 127A(h)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The temporary
guardianship of the missing person's estate shall continue until the confirmation of the death of
the missing person, a court declares the missing person dead under applicable statutes, the
return of the missing person, the location of the missing person, or the purpose for the guardi-
anship no longer exists. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 127A(h)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
410. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 957, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4084,
4157 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 883 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legisla-
ture also made this amendment to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 157. Act of May 29, 1993, 73d
Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 3, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790, 2792 (Vernon).
411. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-115.017 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1994).
412. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, §§ 28-31, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
3340, 3352-53 (Vernon).
413. Id. at 3352 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(24) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
414. Id. (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.025 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). A potential
trustee will not constructively accept a trust merely through inspecting the property. Id.
415. Id. (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.025(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
416. Id. at 3352-53 (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.001(d) (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
417. Id. at 3353 (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.063 (Vernon Supp.
1994)). A potential trustee may also receive reimbursement from trust assets for reasonable
expenses incurred in connection with inspection of trust property, if a court orders reimburse-
ment or if the potential trustee has contracted for reimbursement with the personal representa-
tive of the settlor's estate, the current trustee, the settlor, the settlor's attorney-in-fact, or
anyone who has the power to appoint a trustee under the terms of the trust agreement or will,
and the trust instrument or will names the potential trustee, or the potential trustee has re-
ceived a written request to serve as trustee from a person entitled to appoint a trustee. Id.
(codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.063(c) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
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The legislature amended section 113.109 to provide that the proceeds
from a deferred payment right will be considered income up to five percent
of the value of the deferred payment right, with the value of the right deter-
mined annually, and any excess proceeds will be allocated to principal. 418
The legislature imposed all of the statutory and common law duties of a
trustee upon any life tenant who is given the power to sell and reinvest any
property held in the life tenancy, with respect to the sale and investment of
the property. 419 The legislature guaranteed the homestead ad valorem tax
exemption for homestead property transferred to a trust for the benefit of the
trustor or the trustor's spouse.420 The legislature added section 113.053(g)
to the Property Code to allow corporate fiduciaries to invest funds held in a
fiduciary capacity in mutual funds, even if the corporate fiduciary or an affil-
iate provides compensated services to the fund.421
G. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
The Durable Power of Attorney act repeals section 36A of the Probate
Code and adds sections 481-506 to the Probate Code, to be set aside into a
new chapter, in which is gathered all information concerning the power of
attorney. 422 Probate Code section 482 defines a durable power of attorney as
a written instrument that designates an attorney in fact or agent, that the
principal has signed, that contains words conveying the principal's intent
that the power survives the principal's incapacity or becomes effective upon
the principal's incapacity, and that the principal acknowledges before a no-
tary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgments. 423 Unless
the instrument contains a termination date, the power of attorney does not
418. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 32, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3353-54 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.109 (Vernon Supp.
1994)).
419. Act of May 28, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 846, § 34, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3340,
3354 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). A life
tenant has no duty to sell real property subject to the life tenancy and will have no trustee
duties in connection with any retained property, although common law duties will still apply
to the life tenant. Id. (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
420. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 854, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3367,
3367-68 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13(j) (Vernon Supp.
1994)) defines a residence homestead as residential property owned by individuals or a qualify-
ing trust, which is a trust that allows the trustor or the trustor's spouse the use of the property
as his or her principal residence rent free. Id. The legislature added TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 25.135, which specifies that the ownership interest in a qualifying trust shall be listed as the
name of the trustor. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 854, § 3, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 3367, 3368 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.135 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
Finally, the legislature provided that the qualifying trust and each trustor will be jointly and
severally liable for ad valorem taxes for the homestead property. Act of May 30, 1993, 73d
Leg., R.S., ch. 854, § 4, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3367, 3368 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 32.07 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
421. Act of May 26, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 933, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3953,
3953 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113 .053(g) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
422. Act of April 15, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 49, §§ 1-4, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 103,
103-14 (Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROn. CODE ANN. §§ 481-506 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
423. Id. at 103 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 482 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The
legislature made no provision for witnesses to the power of attorney as required under TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon Supp. 1994).
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lapse due to passage of time.4 24 Section 484 provides that actions taken by
the attorney in fact under the power of attorney at any time that the princi-
pal is under disability shall have the same effect as if the principal were not
disabled. 425
Section 485 provides that if a court appoints a guardian of the principal's
estate following the execution of a durable power of attorney, the agent's
powers under the document terminate and the agent must deliver all assets
of the ward in the agent's possession to the guardian, as well as account to
the guardian in the same manner as the agent would account to the principal
if the principal terminated the power of attorney. 4 26 Section 486 provides
that the principal's revocation of the power of attorney, the principal's
death, or the qualification of a guardian of the estate of the principal does
not terminate the power of attorney as to the agent or any person who acts
in good faith reliance on the power of attorney, if the agent or other person
has no actual knowledge of the revocation, death, or appointment of a
guardian of the principal's estate. 427 If the agent executes an affidavit that
he did not have actual knowledge of termination of the power of attorney at
the time he exercised the power, the affidavit will provide conclusive proof of
the nontermination of the power at the time of the act. 428 Similarly, if the
agent executes an affidavit stating that the principal is incapacitated or dis-
abled, the affidavit shall provide conclusive proof of the principal's incapac-
ity or disability. 4 29 Section 488 provides that unless the document creating
the power of attorney specifies otherwise, the revocation of the power of
attorney is not effective to any third party who relies on the power who has
not received actual notice of revocation. 430 Section 489 provides that a dura-
ble power of attorney for any real property transactions must be recorded in
the county in which the real property is located if the transactions require
the execution of any instrument that must be recorded. 4 3'
Section 490 provides a statutory form for a durable power of attorney. 43 2
Sections 491-504 provide rules of construction concerning the powers con-
tained in the statutory form. 433 The agent may exercise the powers listed in
sections 491-504 in connection with property or interests the principal has at
the time of execution of the power of attorney or acquires thereafter, as well
as in connection with property located in any state, and whether or not the
424. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 483 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
425. Id. at 103-04 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 484 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
426. Id. at 104 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 485 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
427. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 486 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
428. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 487(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
429. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 487(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
430. Act of April 15, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 49, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 103, 104
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 488 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
431. Id. (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 489 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
432. Id. at 104-05 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 490 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
433. Id. at 106-13 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 491-504 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
The legislature also assigned section numbers 501-504 to the new Informal Probate Chapter.
Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 712, § 7, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2790, 2794-95




principal executed the power of attorney in Texas.434
434. Act of April 15, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 49, § 1, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 103, 113
(Vernon) (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 505 (Vernon Supp. 1994)). The legislature
also assigned section number 505 to the new informal probate chapter. See supra notes 316-34
and accompanying text for a discussion of informal probate.
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